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A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and 




No feature of U.S. law has rankled foreign nations more than the supposed 
“legal imperialism” of discovery requests for information located abroad to be 
used in U.S. litigation or investigations. China, France, Germany, and 
Switzerland have threatened the stability of bilateral relations with the United 
States due to overbroad transnational discovery requests. For three decades, 
when faced with concerns of international comity in the discovery context, U.S. 
courts ruled overwhelmingly in favor of discovery through the Federal Rules, 
rendering international comity a dead concept. 
Recent case law, however, shows that this paradigm is coming to an end. In 
a trilogy of cases decided, respectively, by the United States Supreme Court 
(Daimler), the Second Circuit (Gucci), and the New York State Court of 
Appeals (Motorola), each court rejected attempts by plaintiffs to subject foreign 
entities to jurisdiction in the United States or otherwise impose on them 
overbroad duties, including those in conflict with foreign laws. Prominently 
relying on “international comity,” each decision limited the reach of U.S. courts 
and emphasized the need for harmony in the international legal system. These 
three cases are groundbreaking and should lead to changes in U.S. transnational 
discovery. 
The Article analyzes this recent revival of international comity. First, it 
explores the history of international comity and its interaction with broad U.S. 
discovery rules. Second, it briefly reviews the Supreme Court case Aérospatiale, 
which dealt a blow to international comity. Third, this Article analyzes how 
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Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola relied on comity to reach their holdings and 
argues that international comity has been revived in the context of discovery. 
Finally, this Article takes a normative approach and argues that U.S. courts 
should engage in a qualitative limitation of the kinds of U.S. interests that are 
significant in the transnational discovery context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been widely noted that no feature of U.S. law has rankled foreign 
nations more than discovery requests for information located abroad to be used 
in U.S. litigation or investigations.1 For example, Chinese regulators recently 
threatened the stability of bilateral relations with the United States due to 
overbroad transnational discovery requests against the Bank of China stemming 
from litigation in New York.2 France and Switzerland have enacted statutes 
criminalizing the production of documents to U.S. authorities,3 and Germany 
has called it “an intrusion into its sovereignty.”4 Not only do U.S. discovery 
procedures affect international relations, they also deter foreign companies from 
doing business in the United States due to fears of overbroad jurisdiction 
assertions.5 Precisely for this reason, the New York Court of Appeals recently 
intimated that New York’s place as the commercial and financial center of the 
world is endangered by uninhibited personal jurisdiction and the judiciary’s 
overbroad exercise of extraterritorial power over foreign matters and parties.6 
 
 1.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, 
Reporters’ Notes ¶ 1 (1987); Bate C. Toms III, The French Response to the Extraterritorial 
Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT’L L. 585, 585 n.1 (1981).  
 2.  See Letter from Huai Peng Mu, Director-General of the Legal Affairs Department of the 
People’s Bank of China, and Yi Huang, the Director-General of the Supervisory Rules and 
Regulations Department of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, to Catherine O’Hagan 
Wolfe, Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Dec. 19, 2013) 
(writing with respect to the pending appeals in Gucci America, Inc. v. Bank of China, Nos. 11-
3934(L)). 
 3.  Loi 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 relative à la communication de documents et 
renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial ou technique à des personnes ou morales 
étrangères [Law 80-538 of July 16, 1980 on Communication of Documents and Information for 
Economic, Commercial, or Technical Persons or Foreign Legal Entities], Journal Officiel de la 
République Française [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 17, 1980, p. 1799; Brief for 
Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–2, 13–15, United States 
v. UBS AG, No. 09–20423–CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009).  
 4.  See Brief for Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1, 
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3rd Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4272), 2003 WL 
24136399. In many instances, foreign nations are interested in resolving these disputes domestically, 
rather than allowing U.S. courts to sanction their corporations or order turnover of local citizens’ 
accounts.  
 5.  See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008); 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *12, Goodyear Luxembourg 
Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 561 U.S. 1058 (2010) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 4735597 (noting that overbroad 
assertions of general jurisdiction “may dissuade foreign companies from doing business in the 
United States, thereby depriving United States consumers of the full benefits of foreign trade.”); 
Memorandum of Law by Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel at 8, Quinn v. Altria Group, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
8783(LTS)(RLE), 2008 WL 3518462 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (“The prospect of U.S. discovery is 
a harrowing one for most foreigners and provides a significant disincentive to doing business in this 
country, and that disincentive increases to the extent compliance with U.S. procedures would incur 
liability under foreign law.”). 
 6.  Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 21 N.E.3d 223, 228 (N.Y. 2014). 
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Without a doubt, the repercussions of developments in this area of law are 
increasingly important in the modern global economy.7 
In the United States, discovery is a routine procedural issue that courts, 
armed with broad jurisdiction and subpoena powers, are well equipped to 
supervise.8 However, when a lawsuit involves foreign parties and documents 
located in foreign nations, discovery can generate complex and difficult 
conflicts between U.S. procedures and foreign laws.9 This kind of transnational 
discovery has seen much activity recently because foreign corporations with 
affiliates in the United States are faced with an increasing barrage of lawsuits, 
subpoenas, and turnover actions from litigants seeking judgment in U.S. courts. 
Confronted with these conflicts between U.S. discovery rules and foreign laws, 
courts seek to promote international harmony by giving deference to the 
sovereign interests of the affected nations, a principle called “international 
comity.” 
This Article identifies and explains a recent trend in U.S. case law towards 
renewed respect for international comity and foreign laws in the particular 
context of transnational discovery. In an era of austere U.S. foreign and 
domestic policy, courts are following the executive’s lead in refurbishing their 
international comity bona fides when faced with overbroad discovery requests. 
This judicial development is of particular importance for foreign relations and 
the global economy because it will alter the operations of thousands of 
multinationals, the international trade system, and data protection laws. 
For three decades, when faced with concerns of international comity and 
discovery requests, U.S. courts applied a balancing test to weigh the interests of 
foreign countries against U.S. interests, and ruled almost unanimously in favor 
of U.S. interests and the judiciary’s power to reach foreign documents or 
assets.10 Due to the unjustified emphasis on U.S. interests in patent laws, 
antitrust laws, criminal laws, and other broad categories, foreign defendants 
could hardly use international comity as a shield. Instead, comity became a 
frivolous argument raised by foreign litigants as a last, and ultimately 
unsuccessful, resort. 
 
 7.  See supra note 5. Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 
769, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[It] may well be correct that transnational discovery requests are 
increasing due to the global nature of ‘international commerce’”). See generally STEPHEN BREYER, 
THE COURT AND THE WORLD (2015) (describing the growing international aspect of the Supreme 
Court’s docket).  
 8.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 551 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The discovery 
process usually concerns discrete interests that a court is well equipped to accommodate—the 
interests of the parties before the court coupled with the interest of the judicial system in resolving 
the conflict on the basis of the best available information. When a lawsuit requires discovery of 
materials located in a foreign nation, however, foreign legal systems and foreign interests are 
implicated as well.”). 
 9.  See id. 
 10.  See infra notes 253–62.  
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/7
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But, as this Article will show, this thirty-year paradigm seems to be coming 
to an end. In a trilogy of recent cases decided, respectively, by the United States 
Supreme Court (Daimler AG v. Bauman), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
(Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li), and the New York State Court of Appeals 
(Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank), each court prominently 
relied on “international comity” in refusing to subject foreign entities to 
jurisdiction in the United States or otherwise impose on them overbroad duties, 
thereby limiting the reach of U.S. courts. In the context of Motorola and Gucci, 
the courts protected non-party foreign banks from discovery or turnover of 
documents and funds located abroad. These three cases are groundbreaking. 
They may significantly affect the development of transnational discovery and 
strengthen alternative avenues to such discovery. 
This Article analyzes this recent revival of international comity. First, it 
explores the recent history of international comity and its interaction with broad 
U.S. discovery rules. Second, it reviews the Supreme Court case Société 
Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa, which dealt a blow to international comity. Third, this 
Article analyzes how Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola relied on comity to reach 
their holdings and argues that international comity has been revived in the 
context of discovery. Finally, this Article takes a normative approach and argues 
that U.S. courts should engage in a qualitative limitation on the kinds of U.S. 
interests that are significant in the transnational discovery context. 
I. 
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY & DISCOVERY 
A. What is International Comity? 
At its simplest, international comity is the concept of judicial respect for 
the sovereignty of foreign nations.11 Courts have long recognized that 
international comity “is neither a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere 
courtesy and good will.”12 Instead, comity involves “the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, 
and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws.”13 Thus, even where a court is within its powers to hear a 
 
 11.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
 12.  Id.; see also SEC v. Banner Fund. Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 612 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that 
comity in the context of discovery means “the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to 
the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum.”); Hessel E. Yntema, The 
Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1966) (indicating that the concept of comity was developed in 
the late 17th century).  
 13.  Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164. See also Van Den Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848, 857 
(N.D. Ind. 1997) (“In the United States, the comity concept was imported by Joseph Story but later 
modified into a discretionary principle with an ambiguous status between law and policy.”). 
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case or force a foreign corporation to comply with an order, international comity 
compels courts to consider the interests of foreign nations in the dispute. 
Comity could be considered the judicial way of conducting diplomacy.14 
Although not a political branch, the judiciary is often involved in issues of great 
international consequence.15 Whether addressing treaties, foreign wars, 
historical claims, or other important global issues, U.S. courts at times act in the 
name of the country, and as such must consider the repercussions of their 
decisions on foreign relations.16  Justice Breyer recently affirmed the growing 
need for “coordination with other jurisdictions . . . for the smooth functioning of 
our economy and our various institutions.”17 Because of this need for 
coordination, Justice Blackmun once noted that “[c]omity is not just a vague 
political concern favoring international cooperation when it is in our interest to 
do so. Rather it is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect the systemic 
value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.”18 
Commentators typically marshal four major arguments in support of the 
continued existence of international comity in the civil context: (1) the danger of 
double liability that a person or corporation may face at home and abroad when 
there are conflicting laws; (2) the promotion of international commerce; (3) the 
high burden and cost of requiring a foreign party to appear in front of U.S. 
courts; and (4) the interest of U.S. courts in having their rulings recognized 
abroad.19 These arguments can only become more pertinent in the face of 
globalization, where modern corporations have branches and affiliates in dozens 
of countries.20 Ultimately, as described by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
 
 14.  Justice Breyer refers to American judges who travel abroad to participate in exchanges 
with foreign judges as “Constitutional Diplomats.”  BREYER, supra note 7, at 5. 
 15.  See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (involving foreign 
plaintiffs alleging violations of the Alien Tort Claims Act—torture, imprisonment, and murder—in 
Nigeria by the Nigerian government at the urging of English and Dutch oil companies); Bodner v. 
Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (hearing claims from Holocaust survivors and their 
families against French Banks for alleged wrongful taking of money and assets from Jews during 
World War II). 
 16.  See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (1991); Société 
Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 551–52 
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The discovery process usually 
concerns discrete interests that a court is well equipped to accommodate—the interests of the parties 
before the court coupled with the interest of the judicial system in resolving the conflict on the basis 
of the best available information. When a lawsuit requires discovery of materials located in a foreign 
nation, however, foreign legal systems and foreign interests are implicated as well. The presence of 
these interests creates a tension between the broad discretion our courts normally exercise in 
managing pretrial discovery and the discretion usually allotted to the Executive in foreign matters.”). 
 17.  BREYER, supra note 7, at 4.  
 18.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 19.  See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 21 N.E.3d 223 (N.Y. 2014) 
(noting the traditional justifications for the separate entity rule which is itself a creature of 
international comity); see generally Paul, supra note 16. 
 20.  Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/7
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“international comity is clearly concerned with maintaining amicable working 
relationships between nations, a shorthand for good neighbourliness, common 
courtesy and mutual respect between those who labour in adjoining judicial 
vineyards.”21 
Before undertaking a historical analysis of international comity, two points 
of clarification are in order. First, this Article deals with a particular type of 
international comity analysis that arises in the civil law context of transnational 
discovery. Although international comity plays an important role in criminal, 
bankruptcy, tax, antitrust,22 and other areas of law,23 Daimler and its progeny 
have only addressed international comity in the context of civil lawsuits. 
Second, this Article will rely, partially but not entirely, on cases in the Second 
Circuit and Southern District of New York. As the financial capital of the world, 
New York is the nerve center for multinational corporations and banks with 
branches in the United States.24 Because of their status as garnishees, banks are 
popular targets for transnational discovery and turnover requests.25 Therefore, 
decisions in the Second Circuit, and even the New York State Court of Appeals, 
have an outsized influence on transnational discovery and international comity. 
 
2012) (“[It] may well be correct that transnational discovery requests are increasing due to the global 
nature of ‘international commerce . . . .’”). 
 21.  JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 423 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 22.  See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 
(1985) (finding that “concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and 
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for 
predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement” to arbitrate 
antitrust claims); Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 126 
(2d Cir. 2001) (analyzing international comity’s relationship to the enforcement of foreign tax laws); 
United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1996) (O’Scannlain J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting the impact of international comity on a criminal law question); In re 
Bd. of Directors Compania Gen. de Combustibles S.A., 269 B.R. 104, 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(holding that comity should be granted to Argentine bankruptcy proceedings); In re Davis, 191 B.R. 
577, 587 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (evaluating whether to accord comity to a foreign bankruptcy 
case). See also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004) (referring 
to certain extra-territorial applications of U.S. law as “legal imperialism”). 
 23.  See generally William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2071 (2015). 
 24.  See generally Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 21 N.E.3d 223 (N.Y. 
2014). 
 25.  See Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 Civ. 7051(RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
16, 2000), on reconsideration in part, 198 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See, e.g., Motorola Credit 
Corp. v. Uzan, 293 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on reconsideration, 77 F. Supp. 397 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), on reconsideration, No. 02 Civ. 666(JSR), 2015 WL 5613077 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 
2015); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 
262 F.R.D. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571(RJH) 
(HBP), 2009 WL 8588405, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009). 
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B. International Comity and U.S. Discovery: A Half-Century of Interaction 
Permissive discovery rules have characterized U.S. federal courts since 
1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted.26 At the urging 
of Roscoe Pound,27 American procedural reforms beginning in 1906 culminated 
with the adoption of rules that allowed “increased relaxation and expansion of 
procedure.”28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provided parties with the 
power to inspect documents and things “material to any matter involved in the 
action.”29 The rule allowed parties to “examine” any person who might have 
assets belonging to the defendant or, in post-judgment actions, the judgment 
debtor.30 In 1948, an amendment to the Federal Rules expanded the scope of 
discovery to the more permissive language of Rule 26,31 allowing the court to 
order the production of documents “relating to any of the matters within the 
scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his 
possession, custody, or control.”32 At that time, the only vehicle available for 
courts to request help from a foreign government or party was the Letter 
Rogatory—a formal request for discovery assistance.33 
By the 1960s, courts had determined they had the power to order the 
production of documents located abroad.34 This conclusion came as the logical 
consequence of an expanding personal jurisdiction and discovery jurisprudence. 
It is axiomatic that without personal jurisdiction a court cannot order a party to 
produce documents because it has no power over that party.35 However, once a 
court finds it has personal jurisdiction, there are few limits on what it can order a 
party to produce. Further, courts concluded that possession, custody, or control 
over the documents or assets being sought is necessary, because without it a 
party has no practical ability to obtain the documents and thus cannot be 
required to do so.36 These two ingredients became what can be called the 
 
 26.  Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C.L. REV. 691, 698 (1998). 
 27.  Roscoe Pound was one of the most influential legal figures of the twentieth century. As 
Dean of Harvard Law School, he was a prolific scholar and noted legal realist. Pound was a towering 
legal figure at a crucial time for American law.   
 28.  Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C.L. REV. 747, 748 (1998).  
 29.  History of Rule, 8B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2201 (3d ed.). 
 30.  Discovery in Aid of Execution, 12 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 3014 (3d ed.). 
 31.  8B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2201, supra note 29. 
 32.  5 F.R.D. 433, 463 (1946). 
 33.  22 C.F.R. § 92.54. 
 34.  United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900–01 (2d Cir. 1968).  
 35.  Id.; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 141 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A district court, 
however, must have personal jurisdiction over a nonparty in order to compel it to comply with a 
valid discovery request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.”); In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 
337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding it “elementary” that “courts lacking jurisdiction over litigants 
cannot adjudicate their rights”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442 (1987) 
(“A court . . . may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents”). 
 36.  In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/7
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“personal jurisdiction plus control” test that underlies the discovery of 
documents located abroad: U.S. courts need only find personal jurisdiction over 
the party and possession, custody, or control of the requested documents by the 
target of the subpoena.37 Because of these simple requirements, and the 
permissive nature of the Federal Rules, it is typical for judgment creditors to 
demand transnational asset discovery from parties and non-parties alike—and 
courts usually oblige.38 This reach extends to non-party banks that may have 
information about a debtor’s assets.39 
To complement the “personal jurisdiction plus control” test, courts 
recognized early on the importance of balancing foreign interests when foreign 
laws or parties were involved. It was this recognition that created judicial 
concerns with what courts began to call “international comity.” These concerns 
came into play, however, only when there was a  
“true conflict” between domestic and foreign law.40 The Supreme Court has 
recognized this initial inquiry: 
The threshold question in a comity analysis is whether there is in fact a true 
conflict between domestic and foreign law. When there is a conflict, a court 
should seek a reasonable accommodation that reconciles the central concerns of 
both sets of laws. In doing so, it should perform a tripartite analysis that considers 
the foreign interests, the interests of the United States, and the mutual interests of 
all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal regime.41 
 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472 (S.D.N.Y 2014) (“It has long been the law that a subpoena 
requires the recipient to produce information in its possession, custody, or control regardless of 
the location of that information . . . [a witness may not] resist the production of documents on 
the ground that the documents are located abroad. The test for production of documents is 
control, not location.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 37.  See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc., 768 F.3d at 141; In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 
02 Civ. 5571(RJH)(HBP), 2009 WL 8588405, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009); Linde v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 262 F.R.D. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Estate of Yaron Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 400 F. Supp. 2d 
541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Service of a subpoena, even if properly effected, is only valid if served 
on a party who is subject to personal jurisdiction within this district.”); see Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 
Civ. 7051(RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000). 
 38.  See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 695 F.3d 201, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d 
sub nom. Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2254 (2014). But see Ings v. 
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960) (refusing to compel production of documents 
located in Canada because, among other reasons, “[u]pon fundamental principles of 
international comity, our courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such 
action as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary 
circumvention of its procedures. Whether removal of records from Canada is prohibited is a 
question of Canadian law and is best resolved by Canadian courts.”). 
 39.  “It is not uncommon to seek asset discovery from third parties, including banks, that 
possess information pertaining to the judgment debtor’s assets.” EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 207. “[I]n a 
run-of-the-mill execution proceeding, we have no doubt that the district court would have been 
within its discretion to order the discovery from third-party banks about the judgment debtor’s assets 
located outside the United States.” Id. at 208; see also Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. 
Supp. 2d 234, 238–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 40.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 555 (1987). 
 41.  Id. This Article will only deal with cases where there is a “true conflict.” Cases falling 
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Recognizing the problems presented by these instances of “true conflict,” the 
1965 Restatement Second of Foreign Relations Law highlighted that conflict 
with foreign laws did not deprive a U.S. court of jurisdiction but nonetheless 
required balancing the interests of the relevant sovereigns.42 The balancing test 
announced by the Restatement Second of Foreign Relations urged courts to 
weigh five factors: (1) the “vital national interests of each of the states,” (2) the 
“hardship” imposed on the person, (3) the “extent” to which “required conduct 
is to take place” in the foreign country, (4) the nationality of the person, and    
(5) the extent to which enforcement can “be expected to achieve compliance.”43 
Although courts began to weigh these interests in the 1960s, they continued to 
routinely exercise their jurisdiction over documents located abroad, finding that 
U.S. interests generally prevailed over foreign interests.44 
Exemplifying the three-part test that had developed by the late 1960s—
(1) personal jurisdiction, (2) control, and (3) balancing of foreign interests—the 
Second Circuit in 1968 compelled a bank to produce documents located in its 
branch in Frankfurt, Germany, noting: 
The basic legal question confronting us is not a total stranger to this Court. With 
the growing interdependence of world trade and the increased mobility of persons 
and companies, the need arises not infrequently, whether related to civil or 
criminal proceedings, for the production of evidence located in foreign 
jurisdictions. It is no longer open to doubt that a federal court has the power to 
require the production of documents located in foreign countries if the court has 
in personam jurisdiction of the person in possession or control of the material.45 
The court noted that difficulties arose where “the country in which the 
documents are located has its own rules and policies dealing with the production 
and disclosure of business information—a circumstance not uncommon.”46 
Recognizing that it involved an “extremely sensitive and delicate area of foreign 
affairs,”47 the court noted that a rule that ignores foreign laws except when a 
party shows it will suffer criminal liability would “show scant respect for 
international comity.”48 Despite this, the court analyzed the different interests 
 
before this threshold question present comity concerns but are generally less relevant because they 
do not involve an analysis of conflicting laws. 
 42.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 39(1) (1965) (“A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not 
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in 
conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to 
that conduct.”). 
 43.  Id. § 40. 
 44.  See, e.g., Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 
1962); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 
271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 45.  United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900–01 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 46.  Id. at 901. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 902. 
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and upheld the district court’s decision holding the bank in contempt for failure 
to produce the documents.49 
Court decisions ordering the production of documents held abroad 
contributed to the broadening of the Federal Rules, which in turn have cemented 
the development of transnational discovery, even over non-parties, in four 
Rules: 26, 34, 45, and 69. Rule 26 allows broad discovery of “any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant.”50 This language applies in the context of Rule 34, which 
provides that, in general, “a party may serve on any other party a request within 
the scope of Rule 26(b).”51 This can include a request to produce any designated 
document or electronically-stored information.52 Rule 45 specifically allows 
litigants to issue document subpoenas to non-parties, limiting this power only to 
the extent that it imposes an “undue burden,” it fails to provide a reasonable 
time to comply, or it requests privileged materials.53 Finally, Rule 69 allows 
litigants in the post-judgment context to “obtain discovery from any person . . . 
as provided in these rules or by the procedure of the state where the court is 
located.”54 
Notably absent from these rules is any limitation on the geographical scope 
of information discovery requests, unlike the limitations imposed on deposition 
subpoenas.55 Therefore, these rules provide a potent weapon for U.S. litigants 
seeking transnational discovery. In the post-judgment context, for example, the 
Second Circuit has interpreted these rules to mean that a judgment creditor is 
“entitled to discover the identity and location of any of the judgment debtor’s 
assets, wherever located.”56 Given such broad language, it is easy to see how 
conflicts between domestic and foreign law became commonplace. 
C. Conflicts Between U.S. Discovery and Foreign Laws 
The contrast between U.S. and foreign discovery practices is stark. As 
explained above, American courts have long been comfortable exercising their 
broad discovery and jurisdictional powers over parties wherever located. 
Discovery in civil law countries is drastically different from U.S. methods. 
Because the inquisitorial system predominates in civil law countries, it is judges, 
not the parties themselves, who have the exclusive power to gather facts.57 After 
 
 49.  Id. at 902–05. 
 50.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 51.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (emphasis added). 
 52.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A). 
 53.  FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 54.  FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2). 
 55.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 56.  First City, Tex.-Hous., N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 281 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2). 
 57.  Randall D. Roth, Comment, Five Years After Aérospatiale: Rethinking Discovery Abroad 
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compiling evidence, civil law judges produce an official summary, or dossier, 
that is used at trial.58 With regards to document production, some foreign 
countries provide severe restrictions.59 In France, for example, there is no U.S. 
concept of “blanket” requests for documents. Instead, parties can make specific 
requests to the judge, who can then order the production of identified 
documents.60 In Germany, parties are not obligated to conduct a search for 
information that is not readily available.61 Scholars suggest that Europeans’ 
respect for privacy rights explains their overarching anxiety with broad 
discovery.62 As an extension of this general narrowing of discovery, in civil law 
countries there is no concept of pretrial discovery.63 In the United Kingdom, 
 
in Civil and Commercial Litigation Under the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 425, 435–36 (1992); John H. Langbein, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827 (1985) (“Digging for facts is primarily 
the work of the judge.”). 
 58.  Message from the President Transmitting to the Senate the Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, S. Exec. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1, 
1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 323, 326 (1973) (“[C]ivil law technique results in a resume of the 
evidence . . . .”). 
 59.  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 03 Civ. 8845(TPG), 2013 WL 491522 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (reviewing the data secrecy laws of Brazil, Spain, Bolivia, Chile, Panama, 
Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay); Diana Lloyd Muse, Discovery in France and the Hague 
Convention: The Search for a French Connection, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073, 1075 n.8 (1989) 
(discussing French limitations and noting that other civil law countries are similar); Langbein, supra 
note 57 (discussing German law). 
 60.  Muse, supra note 59, at 1080–81 (“In France, the current Code of Civil Procedure (the 
Code) vests all fact-finding authority in the judge. For example, each party, through its attorney 
(avocat), must make any request for written evidence to the judge, who then has the discretion to 
order an opposing party to produce the evidence. Even though the Code authorizes the avocat to ask 
a judge to order document production, judges do not always grant such requests. Thus, although the 
current Code appears to give the judge broad powers to require the production of evidence, 
commentators agree that in practice, the fact-finding process in civil cases has, to a large extent, 
retained its traditionally limited scope.”). 
 61.  Langbein, supra note 57, at 827 (“The defendant’s answer follows the same pattern. It 
should be emphasized, however, that neither plaintiff’s nor defendant’s lawyer will have conducted 
any significant search for witnesses or for other evidence unknown to his client. Digging for facts is 
primarily the work of the judge.”). 
 62.  See, e.g., Muse, supra note 59, at 1087 (“Perhaps the most important explanation for the 
historically restricted access of French litigants to documents of adversaries stems from a larger 
sociological perspective: in general, the French consider privacy to be of paramount importance.”); 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; Benjamin L. Klein, Trust, Respect, and Cooperation May Keep 
Us Out of Jail: A Practical Guide to Navigating the European Union Privacy Directive’s 
Restrictions on American Discovery Procedure, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 623 (2012). 
 63.  Muse, supra note 59, at 1075 (“Moreover, France, like most civil law countries, does not 
have any form of pretrial discovery as it exists in the United States.”). It is also somewhat limited in 
the United Kingdom. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(noting an English court’s rejection of a discovery request because the particular discovery in that 
case was not “provided for under the Hague Convention or British law”). 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z384K2P
2016] INTERNATIONAL COMITY IN TRANSNATIONAL DISCOVERY 169 
 
procedural rules limit discovery of non-parties.64 In other countries, there is no 
post-judgment discovery either, making it difficult for judgment creditors to find 
assets.65 Because of these strict limits on discovery, it is no surprise that 
Europeans worried not only about expansive U.S. judicial power, but also 
expansive discovery in general.66 
Given the unrestricted exercise of U.S. discovery allowed by the “personal 
jurisdiction plus control” test, conflicts with foreign law were a common 
occurrence in the middle and later part of the twentieth century. Courts routinely 
ordered production of documents held by bank branches in Panama67 and 
Canada,68 banking records in Switzerland69 and Germany,70 foreign shipping 
lines’ documents “wherever located,”71 and oil company documents in “foreign 
countries.”72 Some of the most offensive practices in the eyes of foreign 
sovereigns included the taking of depositions by American lawyers in foreign 
countries without the consent of local authorities.73 Not surprisingly, foreign 
laws imposed strict restraints to prevent these abuses. If an American lawyer 
sought to take evidence in France, for example, where discovery is a judicial 
task, the French considered it an “unlawful usurpation of the public judicial 
function and an illegal intrusion on the nation’s judicial sovereignty.”74 This 
stance holds sway in many other civil law countries, including Japan, where 
 
 64.  South Carolina Ins. v. Assurantie Maatschappij “de Zeven Provincien” N.V., [1986] 3 
W.L.R. 398 (HL) (statement of Lord Brandon) (noting that because of certain limitations, “there is 
no way in which a party to an action in the High Court in England can compel pre-trial discovery as 
against a person who is not a party to such action”). 
 65.  For example, in France there are only self-help attachment procedures. CODE DE 
PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. L111-1 (Fr.). 
 66.  See Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“It cannot be 
denied that foreign displeasure with American discovery procedures played some part in shaping the 
Convention . . . .”). 
 67.  First Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 
361 U.S. 948 (1960); Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 191 F. Supp. 206, 210 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 68.  In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57, 60–61 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, Ings v. Ferguson, 
282 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 69.  Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 
357 U.S. 197, 202 (1958); Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972); 
Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. McGranery, 111 F. 
Supp. 435, 440–42 (D.D.C. 1953). 
 70.  United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901–03 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 71.  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 72.  In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to Prod., Transp., Ref. & 
Distrib. of Petrol., 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C. 1952) (noting willingness to grant the government 
access to documents located in foreign offices). 
 73.  See Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Muse, 
supra note 59, at 1073 (discussing U.S. “legal tourists” who went to France in search of evidence). 
 74.  Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour le Commerce Extérieur v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 
105 F.R.D. 16, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Muse, supra note 59, at 1084 (discussing judicial 
sovereignty in France). 
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regulations place strenuous requirements on the taking of a deposition therein, 
authorizing it “only if (1) the witness or party is willing to be deposed, (2) the 
deposition takes place on U.S. consular premises, (3) a consular officer presides 
over that deposition . . . and each participant traveling from the United States to 
Japan to participate in the deposition obtains a ‘deposition visa.’”75 In Brazil, a 
deposition can be a criminal violation given that “Brazilian law subjects foreign 
attorneys who conduct depositions of Brazilian nationals in Brazil to potential 
arrest, detention, expulsion or deportation.”76 In Switzerland, there have been 
criminal penalties for such “intrusive” discovery since 1937.77 
It is worth highlighting that antitrust investigations by the U.S. government 
fueled much of the backlash from European countries.78 In response to antitrust 
investigations in the shipping industry, France passed a blocking statute in 1968 
prohibiting the production of information to foreign judicial authorities “related 
to maritime transport.”79 In 1980, with the French Assembly complaining about 
U.S. “fishing expeditions” and “legal tourism,” France expanded the blocking 
statute to prohibit the production to foreign legal authorities of any “economic, 
commercial, industrial, financial or technical” information “which is capable of 
harming [the] . . . interests of France.”80 Even the United Kingdom took part in 
this backlash, enacting its own limitations on the gathering of evidence therein 
for use in other countries.81 This backlash was evidence of a broad failure of 
international comity. Years later, this reaction against U.S. discovery practices 
prompted the following comment from the reporter to the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law: 
 
 75.  In re Application for Order Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, dated July 16, 2002, No. 
M8–85, 2002 WL 1870084, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002). 
 76.  Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, No. 07-CV-309-
L(AJB), 2008 WL 81111, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008) (“The Ministry also cited as an implicit 
principle of Brazilian Constitutional Law that only Brazilian judicial authorities are competent to 
perform acts of a judicial nature in Brazil.”). 
 77.  See generally Brief for Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 1–2, 13–15, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09–20423–CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 
(S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009).  
 78.  Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 607 F. Supp. 324, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(“The failure to use the Hague Convention is more than a mere technicality. The extraterritorial 
jurisdiction asserted over foreign interests by the American antitrust laws has long been a sore point 
with many foreign governments, including that of the United Kingdom.”). 
 79.  Pierre Grosdidier, The French Blocking Statute, the Hague Evidence Convention, and the 
Case Law: Lessons for French Parties Responding to American Discovery, 50 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 11, 
16 (2014) (“The French blocking statute owes its existence to French government resistance to post-
World War II American antitrust law enforcement against international shipping cartels.”). 
 80.  Toms, supra note 1, at 596 n.41, 611. 
 81.  Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11 (U.K.); see also Laker Airways Ltd., 607 F. 
Supp. at 327 (“The English Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 . . . authorizes and empowers 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to interpose the official power of the British 
Government so as to prevent persons conducting business in the United Kingdom from complying 
with foreign judicial or regulatory provisions designated by the Secretary of State as intrusive upon 
the sovereignty of that nation.”). 
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No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial 
frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for 
documents in investigation and litigation in the United States. As of 1986, some 
15 states had adopted legislation expressly designed to counter United States 
efforts to secure production of documents situated outside the United States.82 
There is no doubting the strength of hostility against U.S. courts in 
international circles. Many countries view transnational discovery as judicial 
usurpation, a wasteful exercise, and a direct threat to their sovereignty.83 By the 
late 1960s there was a clear conflict between the civil law world and the U.S. 
discovery system. A treaty designed to bridge the gap between U.S. discovery 
and civil law countries seemed necessary.84 Both parties had interests at stake: 
the United States in creating a system that would facilitate the production of 
evidence, and foreign countries in moderating liberal U.S. discovery practices.85 
D. The Hague Convention 
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters was signed on October 26, 1968, by all the present 
delegations (the “Hague Convention” or the “Convention”).86 The primary goal 
of the Convention was to “bridge differences between the common law and civil 
law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad.”87 As the Letter of Submittal 
to the President of the United States noted, the signatories were willing “to 
proceed promptly for work on the evidence convention” because of “the 
difficulties encountered by courts and lawyers in obtaining evidence abroad 
from countries with markedly different legal systems.”88 The United States led 
 
 82.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, 
Reporters’ Notes ¶ 1 (1987). 
 83.  See generally James S. McLean, The Hague Evidence Convention: Its Impact on 
American Civil Procedure, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 17 (1986); Douglas E. Rosenthal & 
Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALI Restatement’s Provisions on Foreign Discovery, 16 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1075 (1984); see also Letter from Huai Peng Mu, supra note 2.  
 84.  See Message from the President, supra note 58; see also Rapport de la Commission 
spéciale, 4 Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé: Actes et documents de la Onzième 
session 55 (1970) (Actes et documents). 
 85.  Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1461, 1465 (1984) (“Whereas United States participation in drafting the Convention was 
prompted by the frustration American lawyers had long experienced in their efforts to obtain 
evidence in foreign nations”); see Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(“It cannot be denied that foreign displeasure with American discovery procedures played some part 
in shaping the Convention . . . .”). 
 86.  Report of the United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 787 (1969); The Hague Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 
241, reprinted at 28 U.S.C. § 1781. 
 87.  Comment, The Hague Convention, supra note 85, at 1464; see also Message from the 
President, supra note 58. 
 88.  Message from the President, supra note 58, at 324. 
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
172 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:1 
 
the negotiations, represented by Philip W. Amram, who was appointed 
rapporteur of the commission and co-chairman of the drafting committee.89 The 
Report of the U.S. delegation highlighted that as a matter of international 
comity, the convention sought to construct a process that was “tolerable” to the 
authorities of the country where the evidence was located.90 Further, the Report 
emphasized that “the doctrine of ‘judicial sovereignty’ had to be constantly 
borne in mind.”91 That is, in civil law countries the courts take evidence, unlike 
in the United States where litigants conduct discovery and depositions. 
International comity influenced the thinking of the U.S. drafters and the 
Convention as a whole, and it energized the negotiations.92 
The Convention created the system of Letters of Request as the primary 
vehicle for the production of information abroad, allowing parties to seek 
evidence in a more regulated manner. The system placed national authorities of 
both the requesting country and the target country as gatekeepers. For example, 
if an American litigant sought evidence located in France, he would have to 
adhere to the following procedure: (1) litigant files a proposed Letter of Request 
with the American court describing the information sought and the parties 
involved; (2) the court reviews and approves or rejects the letter; (3) litigant 
obtains a translation and sends the letter, with judicial approval, to the French 
Justice Ministry; (4) French Justice Ministry refers the request to the District 
Attorney for the particular location in France; and (5) internal French evidence 
procedures take effect.93 As described, the procedure gives French authorities a 
gatekeeping role where they can evaluate evidence requests and decide whether 
to comply with them. Moreover, in deference to local law, the evidence is 
actually obtained through the host country’s evidentiary procedures. 
Although the Convention delegates did not explicitly agree to the primacy 
of the Hague Convention over transnational discovery procedures offered by 
local courts, a Commission gathered in 1989 to review the functioning of the 
Convention stated that “the [Special Commission Report on the Operation of the 
Hague Service Convention] thought that in all Contracting States, whatever their 
 
 89.  See Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 86, at 805. 
 90.  Id. at 806. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 568 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he needs of the 
international commercial system and the accommodation of those needs. . . [are] embodied in the 
Convention.”). 
 93.  Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1781); see also Jennifer S. Bales, Initiating and 
Responding to Discovery in Transnational Litigation: Procedures and Challenges, 66 TENN. L. REV. 
765 (1999); 3 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 17:18.  
There is a separate procedure for the use of depositions pursuant to the Hague Convention that 
requires the appointment of an examiner. This Article will not address this deposition mechanism in-
depth because the focus of recent cases has been on the production of documents held abroad.   
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views as to its exclusive application, priority should be given to the procedures 
offered by the Convention when evidence located abroad is being sought.”94 
The United States ratified the Hague Convention in 1972.95 Despite its 
apparent potential, litigants hardly used its procedures over the next decade.96 
Federal courts split over whether the Hague Convention provided a mandatory 
or an optional alternative to the Federal Rules. For example, in Compagnie 
Francaise, the court noted that “[e]xtraterritorial discovery has been standard for 
some time and there is no evidence that the United States, in agreeing to comply 
with the Hague Convention, intended to abandon this practice.”97 On the other 
hand, some U.S. courts enforced the Hague Convention, seeing it as the 
“preferable” means for international discovery,98 and even instituted a rule of 
“first resort” to the Convention.99 By 1988, transnational discovery through the 
Hague Convention was a developing area of the law.100 There was much 
promise that Hague Convention procedures could be a method for redeeming 
 
 94.  See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission Report on the 
Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence Convention, 28 I.L.M. 1556, 
1564, 1569 (1989). 
 95.  118 CONG. REC. 20,623 (daily ed. June 13, 1972). There are currently 58 signatories. See 
Status Table, HCCH, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (last 
updated Nov. 17, 2015). 
 96.  Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“The first-time 
participation of the United States, in particular, presented problems because of liberal American 
discovery practices. One response to the American presence was Article 23, which allows signatory 
states to declare that their compulsory process may not be invoked, via a Letter of Request, for the 
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery as known in Common Law countries. At the same time, the 
participation of the United States offered an opportunity for the other participants to attempt to limit 
American discovery practices which they believed infringed upon their sovereignty.”). This may 
have occurred because only a few other nations had also ratified it. See Comment, The Hague 
Convention, supra note 85, at 1470. 
 97.  Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour le Commerce Extérieur v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 
105 F.R.D. 16, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 522). See also, e.g., In re 
Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 483 U.S. 1002 
(1987); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 606–15, 606 n.7 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub 
nom. Anshuetz & Co., GmbH. v. Miss. River Bridge Auth., 483 U.S. 1002 (1987); Gebr. Eickhoff 
Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 497–501 (W. Va. 1985); 
Adidas Ltd. v. S.S. Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ. 1922, 1984 WL 423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 
1984) (Hague Convention does not apply to French defendant resisting document production); Lasky 
v. Cont’l Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see Comment, The Hague Convention, 
supra note 85, at 1473 n.61. 
 98.  Schroeder v. Lufthansa Ger. Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 
1983). 
 99.  Phila. Gear Corp. v. Am. Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Laker 
Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 607 F. Supp. 324, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. N. Star Int’l Inc., No. 83 C 0838, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13681 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1984); 
Schroeder v. Lufthansa Ger. Airlines, No. 83 C 1928 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1983); Pierburg GmbH & 
Co. KG v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Comment, The Hague Convention, supra note 85, at 
1474 n.61 (1984).  
 100.  See Roth, supra note 57, at 427 n.7. 
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international comity, but in 1988 the Supreme Court ended any hope that the 
Convention might displace the Federal Rules as the primary method of 
transnational discovery. 
II. 
COMITY IN RETREAT: AÉROSPATIALE AND THE DEFEAT OF THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION 
On August 19, 1980, a French-made Rallye fixed-wing aircraft crashed in 
Iowa. Three separate plaintiffs brought suit against the French airplane 
manufacturing company, Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale (“SNIA”), 
who claimed the Rallye was “the World’s safest and most economical STOL 
[(short takeoff and landing)] plane.”101 During initial discovery, SNIA refused to 
produce documents located in France absent plaintiffs’ compliance with Hague 
Convention procedures. The magistrate judge disagreed with SNIA’s position 
and rejected a proposed protective order that would allow “the Hague Evidence 
Convention to override the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”102 Defendants 
appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that if the defendant had 
possession of the documents, it could be ordered to produce them pursuant to the 
Federal Rules.103 The ruling essentially affirmed the “personal jurisdiction plus 
control” test as if the Hague Convention had never been signed. The Supreme 
Court granted Defendant’s petition for certiorari. 
Writing for a 5-4 majority but with a unanimous holding, Justice Stevens 
held that the Hague Convention did not provide the exclusive means for 
obtaining information located in a foreign signatory state.104 The Court 
interpreted the treaty as providing optional procedures for discovery and refused 
to create a “rule of first resort” to the Hague Convention before the Federal 
Rules.105 The Court relied on four major findings for its decision. First, the 
Court emphasized that the treaty did not speak in mandatory terms that would 
exclude other practices (like the Federal Rules). Second, Justice Stevens noted 
that Article 23 of the Convention authorized a State to refuse execution of a 
letter of request for pre-trial discovery, and that this was evidence the signatories 
did not intend to demote their local discovery rules. Third, the Court noted that 
Article 27 of the Convention allowed more liberal methods for rendering 
evidence, which was also an indication that the Federal Rules were still a vehicle 
for obtaining documents abroad. Finally, the Court emphasized that the treaty’s 
 
 101.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 524–25 (1987). 
 102.  Id. at 526. 
 103.  In re Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated 
sub nom. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522 (1987). 
 104.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547. 
 105.  Id. at 542–43. 
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lack of an exclusivity provision likely indicated signatory countries had not 
intended to make it exclusive.106 
In general, the Court displayed a dismissive view of the Hague Convention 
and was comfortable cabining it to rare instances. The majority viewed the 
Hague Convention not as a replacement of the Federal Rules but more as an 
optional procedure that could complement the Rules in instances where a court 
lacks personal jurisdiction. 
On the question of international comity, the Court reasoned that “the 
concept of international comity requires in this context a . . . particularized 
analysis of the respective interests of the foreign nation.”107 Crucially, in 
footnote twenty-eight, the Court endorsed a revised version of the Restatement 
balancing test focusing on the interests of the countries at issue, the importance 
of the documents, the specificity of the request, the place of origin of the 
documents, and the availability of alternative means of obtaining the 
information.108 The Court otherwise noted that objections to discovery “that 
foreign litigants advance should . . . receive the most careful consideration. In 
addition, we have long recognized the demands of comity in suits involving 
foreign states, either as parties or as sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the 
litigation.”109 Although it rejected the Hague Convention and confined it to an 
optional procedure, the Supreme Court was careful to pay lip-service to 
international comity—a feature that became common in the cases that followed 
Aérospatiale. 
The Court’s holding represented a victory for broad U.S. discovery and a 
momentous defeat for international comity. The decision peremptorily dismissed 
the arguments in favor of the Convention put forth by the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany as amici, leading a prominent commentator to declare it 
“loosely-reasoned.”110 As Justice Blackmun wrote in dissent, “the needs of the 
international commercial system and the accommodation of those needs . . . 
[are] embodied in the Convention,”111 and yet the Court seemed content to reject 
it. The decision was suffused with a kind of judicial chest-thumping because, as 
some have put it, the Court was concerned with “reaffirming the sovereignty of 
our judicial system.”112 
 
 106.  Id. at 534–39. 
 107.  Id. at 543–44. 
 108.  See id. at 544 n.28. 
 109.  Id. at 546. 
 110.  See GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 329, 331 (1989). 
 111.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 568 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 112.  See Lori A. Fields, Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District 
Court: The Supreme Court Undermines the Hague Evidence Convention and Confounds the 
International Discovery Process, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 217, 264 (1988). 
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Aérospatiale unleashed a new wave of expansive foreign discovery under 
the Federal Rules.113 Most courts considering requests for discovery paid lip 
service to the Convention, just like Aérospatiale had, cautioning that foreign 
sovereign interests had to be taken into account. But despite this false deference, 
the vast majority of cases involving requests for discovery of documents or 
assets located abroad rejected proceeding through the Convention.114 
Aérospatiale damaged the Convention to such an extent that even in 
circumstances where the Federal Rules seemed inappropriate, such as ordering 
discovery from foreign non-parties, courts nonetheless rejected the 
Convention.115 The Third Circuit went as far in In re Automotive Refinishing 
Paint Antitrust Litigation as refusing to carve out a rule of first resort to the 
Convention for jurisdictional discovery.116 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit refused 
to honor the Convention even in clear instances of foreign criminal laws 
prohibiting discovery.117 
Despite courts ostensibly evaluating foreign interests during this period, the 
Restatement standard seemed muddled, unworkable, and purely for show. Some 
criticized the Aérospatiale model as misguided because U.S. courts could not 
accurately take into account foreign interests due to U.S. judges’ lack of 
experience with foreign laws.118 Others criticized the broad discovery powers 
given to district courts, which consequently did not allow for proper oversight 
by appellate courts.119 Perhaps most importantly, the balancing test allowed 
courts to discount international comity in favor of domestic interests without 
 
 113.  See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention, 
38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 73 (2003). 
 114.  See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988) 
(Convention does not apply unless law of the forum state “defines the applicable method of serving 
process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad”); First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse 
LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 
1996); N. Mariana Islands v. Millard, 287 F.R.D. 204, 214 n.75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]he modern 
trend holds that the mere existence of foreign blocking statutes does not prevent a U.S. court from 
ordering discovery . . . .”); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); 
see also Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03CIV3573LTSRLE, 2005 WL 1813017, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.5571 RJH, 2004 
WL 3019766, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2004); Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 139–40 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); British Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 90Civ.2370 
(JFK)(FM), 2000 WL 713057, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2000) (refusing to defer to Mexican bank 
secrecy law); Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); SEC v. Euro Sec. Fund, 98 
Civ. 7347(DLC), 1999 WL 182598, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1999); First Am. Corp. v. Price 
Waterhouse LLP, 988 F. Supp. 353, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To the 
extent that English or Cayman law is not truly implicated, those countries do not have any interest in 
preventing the disputed discovery.”); First Am. Corp., 988 F. Supp. at 364 (citing Minpeco, S.A. v. 
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). See also infra notes 253–59. 
 115.  First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 116.  In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 302 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 117.  Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 118.  Fields, supra note 112, at 308. 
 119.  Id. 
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proper scrutiny. In the words of one court, “regrettably, the [Aérospatiale] Court 
declined to set forth specific rules” for the international comity analysis.120 
The lack of guidance and apparent overriding concern with U.S. judicial 
sovereignty allowed lower courts to find tenuous U.S. interests that outweighed 
those of other nations, even where the foreign interests were substantial. For 
example, some courts found compelling U.S. interests merely because “the 
United States has a substantial interest in fully and fairly adjudicating matters 
before its courts.”121 In other cases courts were content to override the Hague 
Convention and foreign criminal laws only because a U.S. plaintiff was 
involved.122 In the Southern District of New York, courts routinely dismissed 
concerns with foreign laws and international comity, including in NML Capital 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, where the court rejected possible conflicts with 
the laws of nine countries and ordered the production of documents located 
therein.123 Not only did U.S. courts refuse to comply with the Hague 
Convention, they also made it increasingly difficult for the targets of discovery 
requests to invoke it—placing on them the burden of demonstrating “that it is 
more appropriate for the Court to follow the Hague Convention” than the 
Federal Rules.124 
 
 120.  Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
 121.  Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour le Commerce Extérieur v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 
105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“The United States also has an important interest in protecting 
its own nationals . . . .”). See also, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 
51, 54 (E.D.N.Y 2010) (U.S. litigants and antitrust laws are “essential to the country’s interests”); In 
re Global Power Equip. Grp. Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848–49 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (U.S. company, 
bankruptcy laws, and U.S. courts); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (U.S. plaintiffs and interest in “combating terrorism”); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. 
Litig., No. 02CIV5571RJHHBP, 2006 WL 3378115, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006) (U.S. plaintiffs, 
U.S. witness, and securities laws); Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (U.S. 
plaintiffs, “significant interest in assuring restitution to Holocaust victims,” alien tort claims act, and 
tort law); Soletanche & Rodio, Inc. v. Brown & Lambrecht Earth Movers, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. 
Ill. 1983) (U.S. plaintiff and patent law). See also infra notes 253–59. 
 122.  See, e.g., In re Aircrash Disaster near Roselawn, Ind. Oct. 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295, 309 
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[S]overeign interest in protecting [U.S.] citizens,” plaintiffs, and state products 
liability laws). 
 123.  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 03 Civ. 8845(TPG), 2013 WL 491522 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (ordering production of documents located abroad and dismissing concerns 
with Brazilian, Spanish, Bolivian, Chilean, Panamanian, Paraguayan, Argentine, and Uruguayan 
secrecy laws). See also supra note 115 and infra notes 253–59. 
 124.  In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02CIV5571RJHHBP, 2006 WL 3378115, at 
*2. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2004); Wultz v. 
Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. 
Supp. 2d 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2000); Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Conn. 
1997); In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D. Conn. 1991); see also Matthew B. 
Kutac, Reallocating the Burden of Persuasion Under the Aérospatiale Approach to Transnational 
Discovery, 24 REV. LITIG. 173, 203–04 (2005) (“District courts within the Second Circuit, Third 
Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and D.C. Circuit have all embraced this rule regarding the burden of 
persuasion under Aérospatiale.”). 
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These cases became exemplary of the trend of Aérospatiale-inspired cases, 
followed almost unanimously in lower courts, that can be described as nothing 
less than a wholesale and total rejection of both international comity and the 
Hague Convention. This rejection of the Hague Convention after Aérospatiale 
presents an odd denial of a treaty that the United States sponsored.125 Courts 
have ruled against discovery through the Federal Rules in relatively few cases 
since Aérospatiale and have invoked the Hague Convention in even fewer 
cases.126 Instead, courts have typically relied on the Federal Rules paradigm 
defined since the 1960s. 
 
 125.  See Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 86, at 786. As Justice Blackman 
wrote in his Aérospatiale dissent, the “Convention was drafted at the request and with the 
enthusiastic participation of the United States, which sought to broaden the techniques available for 
the taking of evidence abroad.” Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. 
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 549 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 126.  See, e.g., Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. C10–861 RSM, 2014 WL 
202102, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2014) (“Use of Hague Convention procedures is particularly 
relevant where, as here, discovery is sought from a non-party in a foreign jurisdiction.”); CE Int’l 
Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P’ship, No. 12–CV–08087 (CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, 
at *8–16 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (denying motion to compel production of documents abroad and 
ordering use of Hague Convention); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 160 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, No. 10 Civ. 9471(WHP), 2011 WL 11562419 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011) 
(ordering parties to proceed through Hague Convention for discovery of non-party banks); SEC v. 
Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 341 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (directing party to proceed 
with discovery of foreign non-party through the Hague Convention); Pronova BioPharma Norge AS 
v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453 (D. Del. 2010) (issuing letters of request 
through the Hague Convention); In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 
1084 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (denying motion to compel discovery on grounds of international comity); 
Abbott Labs. v. Impax Labs., Inc., No. Civ.A 03–120–KAJ, 2004 WL 1622223 (D. Del. July 15, 
2004); Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (D. Del. 2003) 
(“Resort to the Hague Evidence Convention in this instance is appropriate since both Mr. 
Duynisveld and Mr. Dietz are not parties to the lawsuit, have not voluntarily subjected themselves to 
discovery, are citizens of the Netherlands, and are not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Court.”); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, No. 02 Civ. 666(JSR)(FM), 2003 WL 203011, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003) (“In these circumstances, it is appropriate that the plaintiffs be required to 
secure the additional documents through the Hague Convention . . . .”); In re Application for Order 
Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, dated July 16, 2002, No. M8–85, 2002 WL 1870084, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002) (“[I]nternational comity-based considerations counsel that the Court 
refrain under the circumstances of this case.”); In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348 (D. 
Conn. 1991); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(denying motion to compel discovery from a Swiss bank on grounds of international comity where 
producing the requested information would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws); Hudson v. Hermann 
Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 40 (N.D.N.Y 1987); Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour 
le Commerce Extérieur v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Cf. Blagman v. 
Apple, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5453(ALC)(JCF), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45401, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
2014) (issuing letters rogatory through the Hague Convention).  
A few state court cases have ordered discovery through the Hague Convention as well. See, e.g., 
In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 539 (Del. Ch. 2014) (ordering discovery to proceed in 
part through the Hague Convention); Husa v. Laboratoires Servier S.A., 740 A.2d 1092, 1094 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297, 302 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1992); Matter of Estate of Agusta, 567 N.Y.S.2d 664, 664 (App. Div. 1991) (“The Principality of 
Monaco is a civil law Nation, and a signatory of the Hague Convention. We accordingly conclude 
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It is important to emphasize that various countries entered into the Hague 
Convention in the hope of limiting U.S. discovery and safeguarding their 
judicial sovereignty.127 Broad U.S. discovery continues to challenge this hope. 
For that reason, civil law countries have been vociferous about their rejection of 
Aérospatiale and its progeny.128 France has been among the most emphatic in its 
rejection of the Federal Rules as a legitimate avenue for foreign discovery.129 
Germany and Switzerland have emphasized in amici, after Aérospatiale, that 
“discovery of [their] nationals pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
constitutes an intrusion into [their] sovereignty.”130 China has threatened the 
stability of its bilateral relations with the United States over the issue of 
discovery.131 Other nations have similarly voiced their concern with U.S. 
discovery.132 The effects of Aérospatiale were clear: the comity system built by 
the Hague Convention was destroyed. 
In sum, the Aérospatiale-era consisted of a feeble tripartite arrangement to 
accommodate international comity. Whenever difficulties between U.S. 
discovery procedures and foreign laws surfaced, courts had to first determine 
whether there was a “true conflict” between domestic and foreign law.133 This 
 
that the order compelling Riccardo to testify at a deposition in New York constituted an improper 
assertion of power beyond the Surrogate’s Court’s jurisdiction.”); Intercontinental Credit Corp., Div. 
of Pan Am. Trade Dev. Corp. v. Roth, 595 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (vacating subpoena 
served on the New York office of a non-party bank seeking disclosure of assets held in Israeli 
branches, and noting that the Hague Convention is “virtually compulsory” where disclosure is 
sought from foreign non-parties); Orlich v. Helm Bros., Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14 (App. Div. 1990) 
(“When discovery is sought from a non-party in a foreign jurisdiction, application of the Hague 
Convention, which encompasses principles of international comity, is virtually compulsory.”). 
 127.  See infra Part I (c); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“It 
cannot be denied that foreign displeasure with American discovery procedures played some part in 
shaping the Convention”). 
 128.  Roth, supra note 57 at n.33 (citing “Letter from Edwin R. Alley, Esq., Carpenter, Bennett 
& Morrissey to Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr. 11, 1990) (noting that at least one nation contemplated acceding 
to the Evidence Convention before deciding otherwise because it viewed the Court’s Aérospatiale 
decision ‘as a message that the U.S. does not take its treaty obligations seriously’)”). 
 129.  In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 355 (1991) (“Although not all civil-law 
countries have expressed their disfavor of private litigants’ use of the Federal Rules’ procedures 
within its borders, of those which have, France has been among the most emphatic.”). 
 130.  Brief for Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1, In 
re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3rd Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4272), 2003 WL 
24136399. See Brief for Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
1–2, 13–15, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09–20423–CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 
2009).  
 131.  See Brief for Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–
2, 13–15, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09–20423–CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 
2009).  
 132.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, 
Reporters’ Notes ¶ 1 (1987). 
 133.  See CE Int’l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P’ship, No. 12-CV-08087 
(CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013). 
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was usually a low bar that could be met through expert submissions.134 Once 
that threshold was met, courts only needed (1) personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign party; (2) a finding that the party had possession, custody, or control 
over the documents; and (3) an analysis of the countries’ interests through the 
Aérospatiale-endorsed Restatement balancing test. It was this Aérospatiale 
arrangement that unleashed a wholesale repudiation of international comity by 
circuit and lower courts. It ended the promise of the Convention as a way to 
redeem international comity, and created difficulty for countries that saw broad 
U.S. discovery and exercise of U.S. jurisdiction as a threat to their sovereignty. 
III. 
THE RETURN OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY: DAIMLER, GUCCI, AND MOTOROLA 
ESTABLISH A NEW PARADIGM 
Three recent cases have altered the landscape of transnational discovery 
and call into question the Aérospatiale paradigm. It appears as if, in the span of 
a few years, international comity is experiencing a revival. These cases 
prominently featured the interests of foreign nations, and courts responded by 
refusing to subject foreign entities to jurisdiction in the United States or 
otherwise impose on them overbroad duties, including those in conflict with 
foreign laws. These cases open the door to renewed respect for international 
comity. 
Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola are significant for several reasons, including 
their concern for foreign retaliatory laws, overbroad application of U.S. 
discovery procedures, and the possible effects of such broad jurisdiction on the 
international economy. Although previous courts have voiced similar concerns, 
these three decisions are notable because they espouse a consistent rejection of 
Aérospatiale-era jurisprudence and come from the Supreme Court, the Second 
Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals. 
Before undertaking an analysis of these cases, one point of clarification is 
in order: Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola have not come out of thin air. There has 
been a movement in the past few years towards cabining the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, and this Article argues that Daimler, Gucci, and 
Motorola extend this movement into the realm of discovery. In 2004, the 
Supreme Court referred to certain hypothetical extraterritorial applications of 
U.S. law as “legal imperialism” that did not align with principles of comity.135 
The movement to cabin U.S. law has been reinforced by the post-financial crisis 
era of austere U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Two cases signaled the 
beginnings of renewed respect for international comity: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004) (some 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law can constitute “legal imperialism”). 
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Petroleum Co. (Kiobel) and Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
(Morrison).136 
In Morrison, the Court found that certain provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act did not apply extraterritorially, chiding the Second Circuit for 
“excis[ing]” the presumption against extraterritoriality of U.S. laws.137 The 
Court noted the incompatibility of the Act with foreign laws, including foreign 
rules about “what discovery is available in litigation,” and concluded the Act did 
not apply to conduct that occurred outside the United States.138 Likewise, in 
Kiobel, the Court rejected the application of the Alien Tort Statute to events in 
Nigeria, reasoning that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. laws prevented such overbroad use of the statute and “serves to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which 
could result in international discord.”139 The Court specifically warned against 
the “danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
policy.”140 Most importantly, the Court emphasized the deleterious foreign 
policy consequences of “impos[ing] the sovereign will of the United States onto 
conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign.”141 The 
concerns voiced in Kiobel and Morrison are precisely the kinds of concerns 
involved in international discovery. 
Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola are an extension of Kiobel and Morrison 
because they voice concerns with international comity in the context of personal 
jurisdiction and discovery—areas previously dominated by the narrow focus of 
the Aérospatiale paradigm. These three cases are animated by several factors 
that will be discussed below, including (1) changes brought by the modern 
globalized economy and (2) the danger of retaliatory laws in international 
relations.142 
 
 136.  Other cases around this time also emphasized similar concerns.  See, e.g., Figueiredo 
Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 392–93 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds foreign party’s action for recognition of arbitral 
award in connection with foreign controversy). 
 137.  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257 (2010). 
 138.  Id. at 269. 
 139.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) (quoting EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).  
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 1667. 
 142.  Although not a topic discussed in this paper, the rise of e-discovery has certainly affected 
and increased instances of conflict of laws. See generally William R. Maguire, Current Issues in 
Federal Civil E-Discovery, Proportionality, International Discovery and Deposition Practice and 
Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
PRACTICE 2012 (William P. Frank & Jonathan L. Frank eds., 2012). 
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
182 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:1 
 
A. Daimler: The Supreme Court Revives International Comity 
In Daimler, plaintiffs filed various claims under the Alien Tort Statute and 
the Torture Victims Protection Act against the Daimler Corporation in the 
Northern District of California.143 The claims alleged that Daimler’s Argentine 
subsidiary “collaborated” with the Argentine government in perpetrating 
murder, kidnappings, torture, and other crimes against plaintiffs’ relatives.144 
The action had no connection to the United States, as plaintiffs were foreign 
parties, the defendant was a foreign corporation, and the situs was Argentina. 
The case had deep implications, however, for Germany and Argentina, as 
Daimler is headquartered and registered in Germany, and Argentine officials 
were implicated in the claims. Nevertheless, plaintiffs asserted that the court had 
general personal jurisdiction because Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz 
USA, LLC, distributed Daimler vehicles to dealerships in California and 
maintained an office and other facilities in the state. The district court refused to 
find jurisdiction, holding that Daimler’s “affiliations with California” were 
insufficient.145 The Ninth Circuit reversed based on its finding that Mercedes 
was Daimler’s agent and as such provided continuous activity in California 
sufficient for general jurisdiction.146 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, a unanimous Supreme Court fundamentally 
altered the traditional test for general personal jurisdiction and announced that a 
court could exercise general jurisdiction over a corporation only when it is 
“essentially at home” in the forum state.147 This new “at home” test replaced the 
previous “continuous and systematic general business contacts” test, which the 
Court called “unacceptably grasping.”148 Discarding the idea that a large 
corporation can be “at home” in all of the different places where it operates, 
Daimler pointed to the place of incorporation and principal place of business as 
the “paradigm[atic] . . . bases for general jurisdiction” because they “have the 
virtue of being unique—that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place—as 
well as easily ascertainable.”149 Both of these places for Daimler were located in 
Germany. Applying its new rule to the case, the Court held that there was no 
jurisdiction because “neither Daimler nor [Mercedes] is incorporated in 
California, nor does either entity have its principal place of business there.”150 
Moreover, it found that this was not a case of “exceptional” circumstances that 
would warrant finding general jurisdiction. 
 
 143.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 144.  Id. at 751.  
 145.  Id. at 752. 
 146.  Id. at 753. 
 147.  Id. at 769. 
 148.  Id. at 761. 
 149.  Id. at 760 (internal citations and quotes omitted). 
 150.  Id. at 761. 
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Daimler fundamentally changed the corporate personal jurisdiction 
analysis, and it did so based partly on grounds of international comity. In a 
decisive sentence, the Court reproached the Ninth Circuit for “pa[ying] little 
heed to the risks to international comity its expansive view of general 
jurisdiction posed.”151 Rather than expressing mere generalities about foreign 
laws, the Court cited specific European Union rules, noting that, “[i]n the 
European Union, for example, a corporation may generally be sued in the nation 
in which it is ‘domiciled,’ a term defined to refer only to the location of the 
corporation’s ‘statutory seat,’ ‘central administration,’ or ‘principal place of 
business.’”152 Additionally, to show that its reasoning was based on concrete 
concerns, the Court cited the Solicitor General’s opinion that “foreign 
governments’ objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of general 
jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of international agreements on 
the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments.”153 The Court 
concluded that such comity concerns guided its decision regarding personal 
jurisdiction. 
Emphasizing the import of international comity in the decision, amici 
submitted to the Supreme Court in Daimler persuasively highlighted the dangers 
to the economy posed by broad U.S. jurisdiction and weakened international 
harmony. Various foreign corporations, including German banks and the Swiss 
Chamber of Commerce, argued as amici that “[t]he extraterritorial reach of U.S. 
laws—including U.S. courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-U.S. 
businesses with respect to those companies’ activities outside the United 
States—creates tremendous uncertainty that deters investment in and trade with 
the United States.”154 Moreover, they highlighted that a rule granting general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations with affiliates in the United States “has 
significant implications for international comity.”155 The amici pointed 
specifically to problems with broad U.S. discovery, arguing that “given the 
uniquely expansive procedural rules governing civil litigation in the United 
States—including broad discovery . . . there is no doubt that foreign enterprises 
would revamp their operations to avoid subjecting themselves to general 
jurisdiction in U.S. courts, even if that would require relocating or significantly 
 
 151.  Id. at 763.  
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler AG 
v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3377321, at *2 (citing Friedrich K. 
Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 161–62) 
(expressing concern that unpredictable applications of general jurisdiction based on activities of 
U.S.-based subsidiaries could discourage foreign investors). See also Brief for the Respondents, 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 4495139, at *35 
(acknowledging that the “doing business” basis for general jurisdiction has led to “international 
friction”). 
 154.  Brief for Economiesuisse et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler 
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3421893, at *1. 
 155.  Id. at *3. 
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reducing their U.S. operations.”156 The amici also recognized that broad 
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction “will inevitably injure . . . international 
comity.”157 Finally, the amici concluded that withdrawal of foreign companies 
“would inflict significant harm upon the U.S. economy [and] would decrease 
foreign direct investment, which contributes significantly to [the U.S.] 
economy.”158 Undoubtedly, according to the amici, the economic and 
international comity effects of personal jurisdiction and discovery are closely 
linked. 
Defendants in Daimler also highlighted the effects on the international 
system of America’s uninhibited judicial power, noting that Judge O’Scannlain 
had sought a rehearing of the Ninth Circuit’s decision en banc because the 
decision could “have unpredictable effects on foreign policy and international 
comity . . . as well as on our nation’s economy.”159 Defendants warned that 
foreign corporations would withdraw their investments from the United States 
and the possible damage this could cause to “U.S. consumers and the U.S. 
economy.”160 Justice Sotomayor explicitly recognized these arguments, noting 
in her concurrence that “[w]hat has changed since International Shoe is not the 
due process principle of fundamental fairness but rather the nature of the global 
economy.”161 
In sum, Daimler’s significance for transnational discovery rests on its 
direct attack on the foundations of the Aérospatiale paradigm: broad personal 
jurisdiction and disregard for international comity. Without these two 
fundamentals, the Aérospatiale paradigm is weakened, and the Hague 
Convention remains the only alternative for transnational discovery. Daimler 
also shows that the Supreme Court has begun to grapple with international trade 
and comity in a new way. The decision intimates that the Aérospatiale paradigm 
is outdated. Daimler threw down the gauntlet for future courts, urging them to 
consider international comity as a crucial concern, rather than as a formality that 
should be dismissed through a contrived balancing test. 
B. Gucci: The Second Circuit Takes International Comity a Step Further 
Gucci America Inc. v. Weixing Li, decided in September of 2014, followed 
directly in the footsteps of Daimler. In Gucci, defendants sold counterfeit luxury 
goods over the Internet, labeled as Gucci and other brands, and wired the 
proceeds of their sales to Bank of China accounts.162 Plaintiffs, manufacturers of 
 
 156.  Id. at *10. 
 157.  Id. at *4. 
 158.  Id. at *11. 
 159.  Brief for Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 
2013 WL 3362080, at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160.  Id. at *35. 
 161.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 771 (2014).  
 162.  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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the real luxury products, filed an action in the Southern District of New York 
seeking to protect their intellectual property from the alleged counterfeiters.163 
During pre-trial discovery, plaintiffs sought to freeze defendants’ assets to 
ensure recovery and safeguard evidence of the unlawful conduct.164 
Accordingly, plaintiffs served Bank of China (“BOC”) with an asset freeze 
injunction and a subpoena for documents at its New York City branch, seeking 
an asset freeze and information from “any and all Bank of China accounts 
associated with [defendants].”165 In response to the subpoena and asset freeze, 
the BOC, a bank that is majority owned by the Chinese government, produced 
documents from its New York City branch but stated that it could not search for 
records located in China.166 The district court held BOC in contempt, and the 
bank appealed.167 
Applying Daimler, the Second Circuit concluded that there was no general 
jurisdiction over BOC because the bank was not “at home” in New York.168 The 
court dismissed plaintiffs’ arguments that Daimler did not apply to non-parties, 
stating: 
BOC’s nonparty status does not alter the applicability of these cases to the 
question presented here. The essence of general personal jurisdiction is the ability 
to entertain ‘any and all claims’ against an entity based solely on the entity’s 
activities in the forum, rather than on the particulars of the case before the 
court.169 
The Second Circuit further held that BOC did not waive its personal jurisdiction 
defense because Daimler had created an entirely new test.170 Therefore, the 
Second Circuit found general jurisdiction was lacking because BOC “has branch 
offices in the forum, but is incorporated and headquartered elsewhere,” and it 
“has only four branch offices in the United States and only a small portion of its 
worldwide business is conducted in New York.”171 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 127. 
 167.  Id. at 128. 
 168.  Id. at 134–35. 
 169.  Id. at 134 n.13. 
 170.  Id. at 135. 
 171.  Id. Gucci also intimated that personal jurisdiction might be found where an entity has 
“consented to personal jurisdiction in New York by applying for authorization to conduct business in 
New York and designating the New York Secretary of State as its agent for service of process.” Id. 
at 136 n.15. However, this seems unlikely to develop into a feasible jurisdiction avenue because 
foreign banks register with state banking authorities under Section 200 of the New York Banking 
Law, which grants only specific jurisdiction. See Gliklad v. Bank Hapoalim B.M., No. 155195/2014, 
2014 WL 3899209, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2014). In addition, the New York State Senate 
recently rejected a bill (S. 7078) that would have made consent to do business a grant of general 
jurisdiction. But see Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587 (D. 
Del. 2015) (finding that registration to do business in Delaware conferred the court with general 
jurisdiction).  
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Crucially, the court emphasized the importance of international comity, 
remanding with specific instructions for the district court to consider “whether, 
assuming the necessary [specific] jurisdiction is present, such an order is 
consistent with principles of international comity.”172 The court stressed that its 
decision was wholly based on Daimler, and noted that the Supreme Court had 
“expressly warned against the ‘risks to international comity’ of an overly 
expansive view of general jurisdiction inconsistent with the fair play and 
substantial justice due process demands.”173 The court found important a BOC 
declaration from a Chinese law expert showing a direct conflict between 
plaintiffs’ demands and Chinese banking laws.174 Emphasizing its overriding 
concern with international comity, the court cited Aérospatiale for the principle 
that “[t]he doctrine of international comity ‘refers to the spirit of cooperation in 
which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws 
and interests of other sovereign states.’”175 Moreover, the court held that an 
international comity analysis under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations176 is appropriate even in the context of asset freeze injunctions, a 
 
 172.  Gucci Am., Inc., 768 F.3d at 129. 
 173.  Id. at 135 (quotation marks omitted).  
 174.  Id. at 138. 
 175.  Id. at 139. 
 176.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987). The Restatement 
provides the following: 
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having 
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. 
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is 
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: (a) the 
link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the 
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or 
economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible 
for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is 
designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of 
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such 
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by 
the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, 
or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the 
traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have 
an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation 
by another state. (3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to 
exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states 
are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other 
state’s interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, including 
those set out in Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state’s 
interest is clearly greater.  
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situation that did not previously require such an analysis.177 Simply stated, the 
court made international comity a central consideration in the case. 
To further emphasize the renewed importance of international comity, the 
Second Circuit peremptorily dismissed plaintiffs’ waiver argument in the asset 
freeze context, ruling that international comity arguments cannot be waived.178 
The court stated: “given the important role that comity plays in ensuring the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, we do not deem the issue forfeited.”179 
Finally, the court instructed the district court to conduct a comity analysis and 
give “due regard to the various interests at stake, including: (1) the Chinese 
Government’s sovereign interests in its banking laws; [and] (2) the Bank’s 
expectations, as a nonparty, regarding the regulation to which it is subject in its 
home state and also in the United States.”180 
In renewing the importance of international comity, Gucci follows directly 
from Daimler. Both courts found it vital to highlight the important interests of 
foreign countries and the necessary limits that international relations impose on 
U.S. courts. Several issues of foreign relations came to the forefront in Gucci 
that became imperative to the case and raised the issue of international comity. 
First, the Bank of China introduced a letter written by an official from the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission, raising concerns about the impact the 
case could have on China-U.S. relations.181 The letter argued that Chinese bank 
privacy and secrecy laws were essential to the country’s sovereignty, and that a 
conflicting order from a U.S. court would place the bank in an untenable 
position.182 Further, the letter highlighted the importance of the U.S.-China 
economic relationship and the resulting harmful impact on trade of a conflicting 
U.S. court order. 
Second, the High People’s Court of Beijing Municipality ordered the BOC 
to resume regular services to the defendants, in effect overturning the asset 
freeze imposed by the district court. This conflicting ruling gave international 
comity more than a speculative role in the case. The Chinese government and its 
courts were serious about protecting their interests, which should have been 
expected given the BOC’s status as a state-owned entity of vital importance to 
the Chinese government. 
 
 177.  Gucci Am. Inc., 768 F.3d at 140 (“Ordering compliance with an asset freeze, however, 
implicates different concerns from those implicated by an order for the production of documents”). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 180.  Id. See also Gliklad v. Bank Hapoalim B.M., No. 155195/2014, 2014 WL 3899209, at *1 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2014) (holding that a foreign bank with a New York branch did not “meet the 
two paradigm bases for general jurisdiction articulated in Daimler. [The bank] is incorporated in 
Israel and its principal place of business is in Tel Aviv”).  
 181.  Letter from Huai Peng Mu, supra note 2. 
 182.  Id. 
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Third, the U.S. government as amicus curiae argued strongly for vacatur so 
that the lower court could perform a “thorough international-comity” analysis 
and carefully weigh the sovereign interests at stake.183 The U.S. government 
argued that when the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws implicate sovereign 
interests of foreign countries, “submissions from interested governments that 
address comity issues should be given serious consideration.”184 Moreover, the 
amicus made an important declaration: comity is not “mere courtesy and good 
will,” but involves serious consideration of “international duty and 
convenience.”185 The amicus announced the government’s official policy that 
the U.S. legal system should promote harmony, coordination, and respect for 
foreign sovereigns. Accordingly, the government lambasted the district court for 
not taking into account China’s interests, arguing that the “Gucci court should 
have been more mindful . . . and should not have summarily dismissed 
representations describing the national importance of China’s banking secrecy 
laws.”186 The U.S. position clearly recognized that deep issues of Chinese 
sovereignty and trade relations were at stake. 
In sum, international comity was integral in the Second Circuit’s Gucci 
decision. Building on Daimler, the Second Circuit and U.S. amicus emphasized 
the renewed importance of international comity and its central role in foreign 
relations. Regardless of the reasons for the renewed importance of comity, the 
Second Circuit wanted to make clear to lower courts that comity should be 
seriously considered in every decision affecting foreign countries. 
C. Motorola: The New International Comity Paradigm is Established 
In Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered, the New York State Court 
of Appeals upheld the continued applicability of the separate entity rule,187 
which dictates that a U.S. bank branch is not concerned or responsible for assets 
held in foreign branches and thus cannot be forced to restrain or turnover assets 
held abroad.188 The separate entity rule is the embodiment of international 
 
 183.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122 
(2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-3934), 2014 WL 2290273, at *3. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at *17.  
 186.  Id. at *25. 
 187.  The separate entity rule is a creature of New York common law, providing that even if a 
bank is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, “its other branches are to be treated as separate 
entities for certain purposes,” including prejudgment attachments and “postjudgment restraining 
notices and turnover orders.” As the Motorola court noted, the rule has been justified on three 
grounds: (1) the importance of international comity and respect for foreign sovereigns’ power over 
banks located in their countries; (2) the danger of double liability that banks may face at home and 
abroad; and (3) the high burden and cost of requiring banks to “monitor and ascertain the status of 
bank accounts in numerous other branches.” Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 21 
N.E.3d 223, 226-27 (2014).  
 188.  Id. at 149. 
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comity; it exists to avoid forcing foreign bank branches to comply with U.S. 
orders and as recognition of foreign sovereign power over banks located in their 
countries. Daimler and Gucci provided intellectual support for the revival of the 
rule. 
Motorola involved the prolonged litigation of Motorola Credit Corporation 
against the Uzans, a Turkish family involved in a sprawling web of businesses. 
The Uzans borrowed billions of dollars from Motorola before diverting and 
misappropriating those funds. In 2003, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York awarded Motorola $2.1 billion in compensatory damages 
and noted that the Uzans were criminals who had “perpetrated a huge fraud.”189 
Since 2003, Motorola has endeavored to enforce its award, as well as $1 billion 
in additional punitive damages, by serving subpoenas on non-party banks and 
attempting to attach Uzan-related property around the world.190 
In 2013, the district court ordered the restraining of Uzan assets anywhere 
in the world by anyone with notice of the order. Thereafter, Motorola served 
restraining orders and subpoenas on a variety of banks, including Standard 
Chartered Bank (“SCB”), a bank incorporated and headquartered in the United 
Kingdom, through service on its New York branch.191 Pursuant to the order, 
SCB searched and located Uzan assets in its United Arab Emirates branches.192 
After SCB froze $30 million worth of Uzan assets, the U.A.E. central bank 
retaliated against SCB by debiting around $30 million from an SCB account 
therein. Likewise, the Central Bank of Jordan seized documents from SCB’s 
Jordan branch to punish the bank.193 These actions prompted SCB to seek relief 
from the restraining order and the subpoena, arguing that the separate entity rule 
and international comity confined the restraining notice to its New York branch 
and not its foreign branches.194 Motorola moved to compel the requests. 
In August of 2013, the district court sided with SCB and refused to compel 
the subpoenas because of, among other things, international comity. In its 
analysis, the court noted that the subpoenas implicated the criminal laws of 
Jordan and the U.A.E., which were being enforced to the detriment of SCB. 
Although the court rejected the applicability of the separate entity rule, it 
ultimately found that international comity weighed against the production of 
SCB documents in the U.A.E. and Jordan. This was a victory for international 
comity. Motorola appealed this decision, and the Second Circuit certified the 
question of the separate entity rule to the New York Court of Appeals. 
A five-member majority of the Court of Appeals upheld the separate entity 
rule as a crucial part of New York common law. The court noted that “[c]ourts 
 
 189.  Id. at 156. 
 190.  Id. at 156–57. 
 191.  Id. at 157.  
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
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have repeatedly used it to prevent the postjudgment restraint of assets situated in 
foreign branch accounts based solely on the service of a foreign bank’s New 
York branch.”195 The majority concluded that a “judgment creditor’s service of 
a restraining notice on a garnishee bank’s New York branch is ineffective under 
the separate entity rule to freeze assets held in the bank’s foreign branches.”196 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority analyzed the history and purpose 
of the rule and emphasized that one of the most important justifications for the 
rule was “the importance of international comity” and foreign laws and 
regulations.197 The majority observed that the same justifications that led to the 
creation of the rule continued to resonate, including the avoidance of 
“competing claims and the possibility of double liability” and “the practical 
constraints and costs associated with conducting a worldwide search for a 
judgment debtor’s assets.”198 The majority thus rejected Motorola’s argument 
that new technological developments rendered the rule anachronistic. 
In the context of discovery and comity, the court made various relevant 
findings that follow directly from Daimler. First, to emphasize that it was 
following the Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals cited Daimler as 
“recognizing the importance of considering ‘the risks to international comity’” 
and supporting the proposition that “the separate entity rule promotes 
international comity and serves to avoid conflicts among competing legal 
systems.”199 Second, the court noted the costs of worldwide discovery, 
commenting that “courts have continued to recognize the practical constraints 
and costs associated with conducting a worldwide search for a judgment 
debtor’s assets.”200 The prospect of burdensome discovery and its implications 
for international comity was an important factor animating the decision. Third, 
the court recognized that the rule provided benefits to international banks and to 
New York’s “status as the preeminent commercial and financial nerve center of 
the Nation and the world.”201 Finally, the majority noted that in this specific 
case SCB faced clear repercussions in Jordan and the U.A.E., placing it in an 
impossible situation and risking double liability.202 In sum, Motorola’s holding, 
much like Daimler and Gucci, was based on practical considerations of 
international comity, the global economy, and the United States’ place in it. 
Writing for the dissent, Judge Abdus-Salaam echoed Aérospatiale’s 
embrace of broad U.S. power over foreign parties and defended broad 
 
 195.  Id. at 162. 
 196.  Id. at 163. 
 197.  Id. at 159. 
 198.  Id. at 159–62. 
 199.  Id. at 162. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 202.  It bears emphasis that the relevance of foreign criminal laws providing the prospect of 
double liability is one of the foundational reasons for the existence of international comity. 
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jurisdiction as appropriate in the modern world where discovery should not be 
burdensome. After laying out its view of the world as different than the 
majority’s, the dissent dismissed the court’s concern with comity as “akin to 
using a cannon to kill a fly” because many countries did not have conflicting 
laws and thus a case-by-case approach would be more appropriate. Judge 
Abdus-Salaam otherwise criticized the separate entity rule as anachronistic and 
misguided. First, the dissent complained that the decision allowed the criminal 
Uzan family to evade enforcement proceedings in New York and shielded 
judgment creditors who could “make a mockery of our courts’ duly entered 
judgments.”203 A general fear that judgments will go unenforced is a common 
concern among courts that support broad U.S. discovery. Second, the dissent 
relied on statutory construction of New York’s Civil Practice and Rules, 
concluding that under Section 5222 foreign bank branches were not exempt 
from complying with a restraining notice.204 Third, Judge Abdus-Salaam 
emphasized that technology had rendered the rule obsolete because “[i]n this 
day of centralized banking and advanced technology, bank branches can 
communicate with each other in a matter of seconds.”205 Plaintiffs seeking broad 
discovery typically argue it is not as burdensome as defendants or non-parties 
claim it is. Finally, the dissent stressed that banks faced increasingly complex 
regulations and were not deterred from conducting business in New York and 
would thus adapt to the abolishment of the separate entity rule. In support of this 
conclusion, Judge Abdus-Salaam quipped that: 
Banks have apparently adjusted to the societal expectation that they will be 
responsible corporate citizens, presumably by using modern technology and a 
reasonable share of their resources to shoulder the burden of compliance with a 
regulatory regime of global reach.206 
This sentence encapsulated the dissent’s theory: banks will adapt and comply, as 
they have with other regulations, as long as courts require them to do so. The 
dissent concluded that the rights of judgment creditors outweighed the concerns 
of foreign banks. 
On the whole, Motorola is a remarkable case that explores two vastly 
different views of the modern globalized economy and the United States’ place 
in it. The majority strained to maintain New York’s privileged position as the 
financial capital of the world while the dissent dismissed these concerns as 
overblown and irrelevant. In so doing, Motorola relied on Daimler and Gucci’s 
renewed appreciation for international comity, emphasizing respect for foreign 
countries and the need to limit the uninhibited nature of U.S. judicial power. 
 
 203.  Motorola Credit Corp., 24 N.Y.3d at 164 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting). 
 204.  Id. at 165–66. The dissent criticized the Separate Entity Rule as a “judicially created 
doctrine” that is not “tethered to the CPLR’s text.” Because the CPLR did not limit the reach of 
restraining notices, the dissent concluded that restraining notices applied abroad and the Separate 
Entity Rule should therefore be “rejected, not embraced.” 
 205.  Id. at 167.  
 206.  Id. at 169. 
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Motorola is crucial because it will impact the way banks operate in New York, 
and it signals the extension of Daimler into matters of state law. 
*  *      * 
In conclusion, Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola represent a new paradigm of 
respect for international comity. These cases signify a break from the past 
because they made international comity a prominent reason for refusing to hear 
cases implicating foreign interests. These cases also weakened the Aérospatiale 
paradigm that relied on personal jurisdiction and control. Although many other 
courts had considered international comity in the past—through a pretense 
balancing test—no three cases from such prominent courts had so thoroughly 
and so quickly linked respect for other sovereigns to decisions about jurisdiction 
and discovery.207 
One could argue that Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola are outliers because of 
their unique facts: the involvement of the Argentine government and a German 
corporation, the state-owned Bank of China, and the threat of actual criminal 
punishment confronting SCB in other countries. Yet the Aérospatiale-era was 
littered with cases involving even greater foreign interests. For example, in 
Bodner v. Paribas, plaintiff Holocaust survivors and defendant French Banks 
implicated the deep and historical interests of a variety of European countries.208 
Similarly, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. involved torture, imprisonment, 
and murder by Nigerian government officials and English and Dutch oil 
companies, somewhat akin to the facts in Daimler.209 But in both of those cases 
district courts ignored the overriding importance of international comity. 
Moreover, much like Gucci, Aérospatiale itself and various cases thereafter 
involved state-owned companies,210 and, like Motorola, foreign countries have 
threatened to punish companies who produce documents in U.S. courts.211 There 
simply is no clear way to factually distinguish these cases. 
It seems likely that the newfound respect for international comity will 
revive the Hague Convention.212 The Aérospatiale paradigm relied on two 
 
 207.  Recently, in Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, No. 02 Civ. 666(JSR), 2015 WL 5613077, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y.  Sept. 9, 2015), Judge Rakoff, perhaps recognizing the new paradigm, granted a 
protective order in favor of two banks seeking to avoid discovery in violation of Swiss law. 
Similarly, the district court for the Northern District of Illinois  refused to order two foreign banks to 
produce documents located abroad due to concerns with international comity, holding that “the 
interests of international comity weigh against ordering these foreign non-party banks to comply 
with Plaintiffs’ broad discovery requests.”  Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran,  No.08 C 1939 
(N.D. Ill. May 19, 2016) Dkt. 203. 
 208.  Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).  
 209.  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 210.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 524 n.2 (1987). 
 211.  In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 736 F.2d 864, 866 (2d Cir. 1984) (ordering production of 
documents despite threats from the Swiss government of criminal consequences). 
 212.  Requests for documents held abroad can be targeted at (1) foreign companies with U.S. 
affiliates or at (2) U.S. companies with foreign affiliates. These cases directly attack the first kind of 
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pillars: control and personal jurisdiction. Daimler and Gucci have severely 
limited the existence of general personal jurisdiction over foreign companies 
with affiliates in the United States. As long as the foreign companies involved in 
any particular case are based and registered in foreign countries, they are not “at 
home” in the United States and cannot be subjected to general jurisdiction.213 
Therefore, barring an extraordinary expansion of specific jurisdiction or the 
concept of “consent” to general jurisdiction, the Aérospatiale paradigm has been 
weakened.214 Accordingly, the Hague Convention will, at the very least, become 
necessary in cases dealing with foreign corporations with a presence in the 
United States. If Daimler and Gucci are applied consistently by lower courts in 
transnational discovery disputes, litigants will have to familiarize themselves 
with the requirements of the Hague Convention in order to request documents 
held abroad, as it may be the only vehicle available.215 
 
request, and indirectly weaken the second kind. In either case, the Hague Convention should be 
substantially strengthened. 
 213.  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 214.  An expansion of specific jurisdiction is possible, and perhaps likely. But the extent of any 
such expansion is unclear. If the target of a discovery request is a defendant and they are found to 
have “purposefully directed” their activities at the forum, then why would the documents be located 
abroad? This could happen in certain cases but it should not be the norm. Similarly, if the target of a 
request is a non-party, then surely plaintiffs cannot argue that their claims are based on the foreign 
company purposefully directing its activities at the forum and that litigation arises out of or relates to 
those activities. Moreover, in either case courts will have to evaluate the “fair play and substantial 
justice” necessary for any assertion of jurisdiction and, as explained above, may often find that this 
factor is not satisfied.  
On the other hand, on September 29, 2015, the Gucci district court, on remand from the Second 
Circuit, found specific jurisdiction over Bank of China records in China related to New York 
transactions. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2015 WL 5707135, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015). The court held that the Bank of China had purposefully availed itself of 
New York by establishing an office there, owning various properties, initiating lawsuits, and 
generally doing business therein. As such, Bank of China gained access to “New York’s dependable 
and transparent banking system, the dollar as a stable and fungible currency, and the predictable 
jurisdictional and commercial law of New York and the United States.” Id. at *3. The court also 
rejected comity concerns, but mostly because it had already conducted a pre-Daimler comity 
analysis. Id. at *11–12. It is unlikely that other courts will follow this precedent to order the 
production of documents held abroad because the documents at issue in Gucci were directly related 
to the litigation and had, at one point, touched New York. See also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 
2016 WL 1305160, at*17-19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3l, 20l6) (accepting a broad theory of specific 
jurisdiction). 
With regards to consent to general jurisdiction, although some courts have been receptive to 
arguments that foreign corporations consent to jurisdiction when they register to do business in a 
particular state, the Second Circuit recently rejected this theory.  Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
No. 14-4083, 2016 WL 641392 (2d Cir. Feb. 18, 2016). 
 215.  Gap, Inc. v. Stone Int’l Trading, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 0638 (SWK), 1994 WL 38651, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1994) (“As a practical matter, in many cases the Hague Convention provides the 
only means to request documents or testimony from foreign non-parties over whom the court has no 
personal jurisdiction and who are beyond the subpoena power of the court.”). See Torreblanca de 
Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 806 F. Supp. 139, 144 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (case dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds where nonparty witness beyond subpoena power of court and Hague 
Convention thus provided only means of obtaining testimony), aff’d, 11 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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Looking to the future, if Hague Convention procedures are invoked more 
often, this could initiate a self-reinforcing mechanism whereby growing 
familiarity with the Convention encourages more litigants and courts to employ 
it. As legal actors become more familiar with the Convention, they might 
develop the institutional knowledge necessary to make applying the Convention 
a smoother and more routine process. That would, in turn, encourage further use 
of the Convention to the detriment of the Federal Rules. This process might even 
catalyze the development of a new treaty that could replace the Convention and 
become even more useful.  In short, the cases and doctrines described above 
may have far-reaching consequences. 216 
IV. 
ECONOMICS AND DIPLOMACY: THE MAIN FACTORS BEHIND DAIMLER, GUCCI, 
AND MOTOROLA 
If Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola represent a change in the law, as this 
Article has thus far argued, then it is worth exploring the reasons behind such a 
change. There are two common elements in these decisions that are worth 
briefly discussing here: (1) the need for reciprocity in international relations and 
the danger of retaliatory laws, and (2) the importance of international comity to 
international trade and the global economy. 
1. Reciprocity, Retaliation, and Foreign Relations 
Concerns with retaliation and reciprocity animated the three decisions. 
Foreign companies often argue in front of U.S. courts that exercising overbroad 
jurisdiction will cause foreign sovereigns to treat U.S. companies the same way. 
If a court orders production of documents by a French company in New York, 
the thinking goes, then a French court is more likely to order transnational 
discovery against a U.S. company in Paris. Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola took 
this argument into serious consideration and followed Kiobel’s advice that 
courts should be wary of the “danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the 
conduct of foreign policy.”217 
 
 216.  On the other hand, requests for documents held abroad by American companies face an 
uncertain future. Although “personal jurisdiction and control” will almost always be present, the 
requests will still involve the interests of foreign countries in the litigation. Motorola may be 
instructive in this regard as it shows that Daimler means more than just a limitation on general 
jurisdiction; it also means greater general respect for international comity. Motorola involved the 
freezing of a British bank’s property in the U.A.E. and Jordan. Although it was not a Jordanian or 
Emirates company, these countries were still deeply interested in the litigation and the New York 
Court of Appeals recognized that fact. Motorola therefore indicates that Daimler’s consequences 
will reverberate in the context of American companies with documents abroad. Courts will have to 
conduct a rigorous analysis of the foreign interests at stake before deciding, as they have for thirty 
years, to order production. 
 217.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013). 
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Echoing one of the most important justifications for international comity, 
the defendant in Daimler argued that broad U.S. jurisdiction would “encourage 
foreign nations to enact retaliatory jurisdictional laws that threaten U.S. 
companies with subsidiaries abroad.”218 This was not an empty claim. It was 
substantiated by Ninth Circuit Judge O’Scannlain’s finding that other countries 
had already enacted retaliatory laws against the United States.219 Indeed, 
renowned academic Gary Born found that: 
[S]everal civil law countries have enacted “retaliatory” jurisdictional provisions. 
These provisions empower national courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign 
persons in circumstances where the courts of the foreigner’s home state would 
have asserted jurisdiction. For example, Belgian domiciliaries can bring actions in 
Belgian courts against foreign defendants if they can demonstrate that the courts 
of the foreigner’s domicile would entertain a comparable action against a Belgian 
defendant. Likewise, Italian courts will exercise jurisdiction over actions by 
Italian nationals against foreigners, provided that the foreigner’s courts would 
entertain claims against Italians in like circumstances. Austria and Portugal also 
have comparable retaliatory statutes.220 
Taking these concerns into account, the Supreme Court explicitly noted the 
Solicitor General’s statement that foreign sovereign objections to broad general 
jurisdiction had “in the past impeded negotiations of international agreements on 
the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments.”221 Even plaintiffs in 
Daimler recognized in their brief that “international opposition to American 
legal tradition” caused “international friction.”222 In short, the danger of 
retaliatory laws or impediments to international negotiations was an important 
factor for the Supreme Court in Daimler. 
In Gucci, the Second Circuit was similarly concerned about the 
consequences of its ruling for China-U.S. relations. Chinese regulators 
submitted a letter ominously warning that the case would impact “the conduct of 
China-U.S. relations, and, in particular, our countries’ Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue.”223 The court took this threat seriously and, as a result, invited the 
U.S. government to weigh in on the case.224 In response, the government urged 
the court to take greater account of China’s sovereign interests and criticized the 
district court for not doing so.225 
 
 218.  Brief for Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 
2013 WL 3362080, at *35. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 1, 15 (1987). 
 221.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
 222.  Brief for the Respondents, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 
11-965), 2013 WL 4495139, at *35. 
 223.  Letter from Huai Peng Mu, supra note 2. 
 224.  Gucci Am., Inc., v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 225.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler AG 
v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3377321. 
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Likewise, the Motorola court did not have to consider a hypothetical 
punishment under foreign law because Jordan and the U.A.E. had already 
proven their willingness to challenge U.S. discovery rules when they held SCB 
criminally liable under local law. The New York Court of Appeals specified that 
one of the main reasons the separate entity rule, itself an embodiment of 
international comity, was applicable in the case was because SCB faced 
repercussions abroad.226 Ordering the bank to comply with the turnover order 
would have placed it in the difficult position of obeying conflicting rules by 
three sovereigns—exactly the kind of situation the separate entity rule and 
international comity principles attempt to avoid. 
In sum, concerns of reciprocity and retaliation played important roles in all 
three decisions. The important feature to notice is that all three courts dealt with 
these concerns in the same way—by emphasizing the importance of 
international comity and foreign sovereigns’ interests in the litigation. Unlike 
the Aérospatiale-era, these three courts took foreign interests seriously, keeping 
in mind the Kiobel advice that courts should avoid “clashes between our laws 
and those of other nations which could result in international discord.”227 
Although many courts during the Aérospatiale-era paid lip service to this idea, 
they often concluded that U.S. interests were more important and justified broad 
international jurisdiction and discovery. Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola are 
revolutionary in concluding the opposite, that foreign interests are important 
enough to limit U.S. general jurisdiction, discovery, and restraining notices. 
2. The International Economy 
International comity has always been, to a large extent, about the 
international economy and commercial system. Justice Blackmun emphasized in 
his Aérospatiale dissent that the Convention “serves the long-term interests of 
the United States in helping to further and to maintain the climate of cooperation 
and goodwill necessary to the functioning of the international legal and 
commercial systems.”228  Commercial interdependence across the globe is one 
of the most important factors behind the need for international legal harmony. 
This is why the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has prudently noted that “[a]s 
globalization advances, the potential for conflicting judicial processes to harm 
U.S. commercial and other interests increases, and in reaction the United States 
has consistently promoted international comity as a means to harmonize 
 
 226.  Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 21 N.E.3d 223, 229 (2014) (“Indeed, 
as the District Court observed, the facts of this case aptly demonstrate that the policies implicated by 
the separate entity rule run deeper than the ability of a bank to communicate across branches. In 
seeking to comply with the restraining order, SCB faced regulatory and financial repercussions 
abroad.”). 
 227.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) (quoting EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).  
 228.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 550 (1987). 
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international legal systems.”229 The Supreme Court recently agreed with this 
spirit, stating that taking account of the “legitimate sovereign interests of other 
nations . . . helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work 
together in harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today’s highly 
interdependent commercial world.”230 
Courts generally recognize the interaction between global commerce and 
international comity but have only recently begun to view transnational 
discovery in this context. Just a few years ago, one court expressly recognized 
that “transnational discovery requests are increasing due to the global nature of 
‘international commerce.’”231 Beyond diplomacy and paying heed to the concept 
of “harmony,” international comity affects the country’s bottom line: the 
economy. 
In Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola, the foreign parties highlighted the cases’ 
possible repercussions on international commerce. The three courts responded 
by finally affirming the importance of international comity in this context. In 
Daimler, defendant’s brief highlighted that Judge O’Scannlain had sought a 
rehearing en banc because the Ninth Circuit’s decision could “have 
unpredictable effects . . . on our nation’s economy.”232 The defendant also 
warned that foreign corporations would withdraw their investments out of the 
United States and that this could cause possible damage to “U.S. consumers and 
the U.S. economy.”233 Justice Sotomayor explicitly recognized these arguments, 
noting in her concurrence that “[w]hat has changed since International Shoe is 
not the due process principle of fundamental fairness but rather the nature of the 
global economy.”234 It seems that Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola recognized 
that, by extension, what has changed since Aérospatiale is the nature of the 
global economy. 
Gucci and Motorola also faced these concerns. In Gucci, Chinese 
regulators wrote a letter outlining that cooperation was crucial “in the arenas of 
banking and finance.”235 Broad U.S. jurisdiction over the BOC threatened this 
stability and the U.S.-China economic dialogue. Plaintiff argued that Chinese 
data protection laws were part of China’s strategy in developing its financial 
system “which is of no small importance to the world economy.”236 The U.S. 
 
 229.  Memorandum of Law by Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel at 6, Quinn v. Altria Grp, Inc., No. 07 
Civ. 8783(LTS)(RLE), 2008 WL 3518462 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008). 
 230.  F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164–65 (2004). 
 231.  Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 232.  Brief for Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 
2013 WL 3362080, at *10. 
 233.  Id. at *35. 
 234.  DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 771 (2014). 
 235.  Letter from Huai Peng Mu, supra note 2. 
 236.  Brief for Appellant, Gucci Am., Inc., v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 
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amicus even asked the court to weigh the interests of China in opposing the asset 
freeze in accordance with a wider balancing test provided by Section 403 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which takes into account “the 
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic 
system.”237 The Second Circuit duly obliged, ordering the district court to use 
that test. 
Motorola prominently featured a profound debate between the majority and 
the dissent discussing New York’s place as the financial capital of the world. 
The majority noted that “[u]ndoubtedly, international banks have considered the 
[separate entity rule’s] benefits” when opening branches in New York, which 
“has played a role in shaping New York’s status as the preeminent commercial 
and financial nerve center of the Nation and the world.”238 The court also 
emphasized that it believed abolition of the rule “would result in serious 
consequences in the realm of international banking to the detriment of New 
York . . .”239 In espousing these ideas, the majority evinced a profound concern 
for New York’s economy and its relationship with international comity. In 
contradistinction, the dissent, embracing the style of Aérospatiale progeny, 
emphasized repeatedly the rights of U.S. plaintiffs to enforce their judgments, 
concluding that “any burden imposed on the banks is far outweighed by the 
rights of judgment creditors to enforce their judgments.”240 Moreover, the 
dissent rejected any arguments that banks relied on the rule, noting that they 
faced increasingly complex government regulations and “[y]et banks continue to 
do business in this country.”241 The dissent went on to emphasize that the U.S. 
government had recently imposed severe fines on foreign banks, but nonetheless 
banks had “adjusted to the societal expectation that they will be responsible 
corporate citizens.”242 
Ultimately, the Motorola dissent rejected the majority’s concern with 
international comity as overbroad because it protected restraining assets in 
countries without conflicting laws. However, an overbroad rule of comity seems 
preferable to one that is underinclusive. As shown infra Part II, the Aérospatiale 
paradigm was insufficient to quell foreign-sovereign concerns with U.S. 
discovery. It was also inadequate for the modern international economy. The 
Motorola majority’s take on international comity sought to foster an 
international environment that promotes cooperation and international trade. The 
dissent did not truly take this into account. It instead focused on the hardship to 
 
11-3934-cv), 2013 WL 1790984, at *37. 
 237.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Gucci Am., Inc., v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 
122 (2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-3934), 2014 WL 2290273, at *20.  
 238.  Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 21 N.E.3d 223, 229 (N.Y. 2014) 
(citations and quotations omitted).  
 239.  Id. at 163. 
 240.  Id. at 170. 
 241.  Id. at 168. 
 242.  Id. at 234. 
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American plaintiffs. But this ignores the fact that American plaintiffs seeking to 
enforce their judgments abroad will not suffer significant difficulties as they 
may use local procedures. 
These two views of the global economy and international comity embraced 
by the majority and the dissent could not have been more different. The majority 
pinpointed economics as the most important factor in the case and saw the 
court’s role as the protector of New York’s position as the financial capital of 
the world. On the other hand, the dissent approached the case from the point of 
view of litigants seeking to enforce their judgments who nonetheless face 
difficulties due to state law artificial restraints. One point to note is that this 
debate over economics was inextricably linked to value judgments about the 
importance of litigant rights and state interests, and involved deep questions of 
international comity and its relationship to global economics. 
In conclusion, Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola challenge the Aérospatiale 
paradigm of international comity partly because of the necessities of the modern 
global economy. Taking this factor into account, the New York Court of 
Appeals saw the separate entity rule as necessary for maintaining New York’s 
place as the global financial center. The Supreme Court in Daimler recognized 
the wide-ranging effects on the U.S. economy and global trade of an 
“uninhibited” rule of general personal jurisdiction. Likewise, the Second Circuit 
saw the danger of upsetting the crucial U.S.-China economic relationship. These 
three cases did not deal with exceptional facts. It is the reality of the modern 
global economy that cases dealing with jurisdiction and discovery will 
inevitably involve important foreign interests. In the face of such a reality, a 
broad rule of international comity is necessary. 
V. 
HOW DAIMLER SHOULD RESHAPE COMITY: IMPOSING LIMITS ON U.S. INTERESTS 
AND REQUIRING INPUT FROM FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS 
The downfall of broad general jurisdiction over foreign parties with 
affiliates in the United States and the renewed respect for international comity 
will have a deep impact on future case law. It will affect the way courts evaluate 
international comity concerns in the context of transnational discovery and the 
Hague Convention. It seems clear that courts should take heed of Daimler, 
Gucci, and Motorola when evaluating international comity and should no longer 
shirk their international comity responsibilities by reciting the elements of a 
pretense test that almost always allows courts to order discovery of documents 
held abroad. Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola require a more serious and rigorous 
consideration of foreign countries’ interests. 
As explained infra Part II, at least two arguments have been leveled against 
the Aérospatiale paradigm: (1) the Aérospatiale balancing test overvalues U.S. 
interests; and (2) U.S. courts are unable to adequately address the interests of 
foreign nations because judges have little experience with foreign laws or 
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international law. These are legitimate concerns with the way U.S. courts treat 
international comity. Scholars and judges writing before Daimler proposed 
improvements to the comity analysis in ways that still resonate today. One way 
to support the changes heralded by Daimler is to alter the existing balancing test 
towards a presumption in favor of the Hague Convention.243 Another way would 
be to shift the burden of persuasion on plaintiffs to prove that the Convention 
should not be employed.244 Although both of these approaches are appropriate, 
they do not tackle the overvaluing of U.S. interests responsible for the excesses 
of the Aérospatiale-era. 
For that reason, this Article advocates a third, more novel approach: courts 
should engage in a qualitative limitation on the kinds of U.S. interests that are 
significant and should require frequent input from foreign sovereigns.245 As 
many courts have noted, the “most important” factor in the comity analysis is 
the balance of national interests.246 Targeting this factor could ameliorate the 
problem of overvaluing U.S. interests above foreign laws and is a particularly 
attractive way to nudge U.S. law towards a more international approach, as it 
does not necessitate a broad makeover of current law. 
 
 243.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 547 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is the approach 
advocated by Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Aérospatiale. This approach would greatly aid the 
adoption of Hague Convention procedures and will limit the uninhibited exercise of U.S. power. 
Such an approach would limit the obstacles currently in place on the use of the Hague Convention 
and would influence the balancing test in favor of the Convention. Justice Blackmun’s presumption 
would shift this burden and force plaintiffs, instead of defendants, to prove that the Federal Rules 
should trump the Convention.  
 244.  This burden shifting scheme has been proposed before, Matthew B. Kutac, Reallocating 
the Burden of Persuasion Under the Aérospatiale Approach to Transnational Discovery, 24 REV. 
LITIG. 173, 199 (2005). Cases that ratified the current burden scheme: In re Auto. Refinishing Paint 
Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2004); Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 
548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2000); 
Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Conn. 1997); In re Perrier Bottled 
Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D. Conn. 1991). See also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. 
Litig., 02-CIV-5571(RJH)(HBP), 2006 WL 3378115, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006). Arguably, 
plaintiffs are in a better position than defendants to meet this burden, as they know the kind of 
information they are seeking, the locations where they are seeking it, and are thus better equipped to 
argue for one procedure over another. Plaintiffs should therefore meet their burden by specifically 
outlining why the Federal Rules provide a more efficient procedure in a particular case, and 
crucially, by showing that the foreign country at issue has cooperated in the past with such requests 
and is likely to do so in this case. Plaintiffs should also be required to evaluate the possible conflict 
of laws and outline why U.S. procedures should nonetheless overcome foreign law. The most 
important effect of such a requirement would be to incentivize plaintiffs to truly consider the Hague 
Convention before launching into broad subpoenas and requests under U.S. law. This would, in 
accord with Daimler and its progeny, limit the raw and uninhibited exercise of U.S. courts’ power. 
 245.  I use the word “qualitative” here to refer to changes in the substantive scrutiny of the 
current comity test. In short, I argue that courts should improve the test by changing the quality of 
their legal analysis. This “qualitative” argument can be distinguished from a second argument I offer 
below: that courts should limit the number of interests recognized by the comity analysis.  
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A. The Problems with the Categorical Approach that Overvalued U.S. 
Interests 
The single most important problem with the Aérospatiale paradigm was the 
pretense of a balancing test, which almost always discounted foreign interests in 
favor of U.S. judicial power. In his Aérospatiale dissent, Justice Blackmun 
correctly predicted this development, noting: 
Experience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by-case comity 
analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be performed inadequately and 
that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be invoked 
infrequently. I fear the Court’s decision means that courts will resort 
unnecessarily to issuing discovery orders under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in a raw exercise of their jurisdictional power. . .247 
Justice Blackmun did not see the three decades of case-by-case comity 
evaluations that followed Aérospatiale, where courts invariably affirmed the 
Federal Rules. However, he understood that a balancing test was inappropriate 
in this context because courts would, even if subconsciously, always favor U.S. 
interests and an exercise of the courts’ “raw power.”248  A balancing test in this 
context was always misplaced because the question for courts was, in effect, 
whether to balance away their power in favor of foreign sovereigns. Given the 
expected effects of pro-forum bias, the test always weighed against comity. One 
court perfectly encapsulated this problem: 
Despite the real obligation of courts to apply international law and foster comity, 
domestic courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals. Domestic courts 
are created by national constitutions and statutes to enforce primarily national 
laws. The courts of most developed countries follow international law only to the 
extent it is not overridden by national law. Thus, courts inherently find it difficult 
neutrally to balance competing foreign interests. When there is any doubt, 
national interests will tend to be favored over foreign interests. This partially 
explains why there have been few times when courts have found foreign interests 
to prevail.249 
Sure enough, case law shows that courts are unwilling to reduce their own 
power, particularly in the context of discovery, where court supervision can 
determine the evidence to be used in an entire case.250 
The effect of pro-forum bias reached such heights that before Daimler, 
courts had nearly stopped their exacting examination of U.S. interests and 
instead had developed certain categories of U.S. interests that automatically 
overcame concerns for foreign laws. These categories included cases involving 
 
 247.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 548 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
 248.  Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“pro-forum bias is 
likely to creep into the supposedly neutral balancing process and courts not surprisingly often will 
turn to the more familiar procedures established by their local rules.”). 
 249.  Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (emphasis added). 
 250.  See notes 252–62 for cases where courts rejected international comity.   
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patent law,251 antitrust law,252 criminal law,253 and anti-terrorism laws.254 
Although these categories concerned legitimate interests, this Article attempted 
an exhaustive review of all court acknowledged U.S. interests and found that 
courts had developed wildly uninhibited categories, where U.S. interests were 
seen as paramount without much explanation. These interests included: “fully 
 
 251.  See, e.g., Coloplast A/S. v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc., No. C10–227BHS, 2011 WL 
6330064, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011); Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De 
Equip. Medico, No. 07-CV-309-L(AJB), 2008 WL 81111, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008); Graco, Inc. 
v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“The present conflict implicates United 
States interests of a Constitutional magnitude. Graco alleges infringement of a patent held under the 
United States patent laws, enacted by Congress . . .”); Soletanche & Rodio, Inc. v. Brown & 
Lambrecht Earth Movers, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (U.S. plaintiff and patent law); cf. 
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 
2012) (“It can hardly be disputed that the United States has a strong national interest in safeguarding 
intellectual property rights and protecting consumers from counterfeit products.”); Metso Minerals 
Indus., Inc. v. Johnson Crushers Int’l, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 504, 505 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 3, 2011), order 
clarified, No. 10–C–0951, 2011 WL 6257135 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Nifedipine Capsule 
Patent Litig., No. M21–51 (JFK), 1989 WL 111112, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1989). 
 252.  See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C–07–5944–SC, 2014 WL 
5462496, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014) (“the strong national interests of the United States are at 
play. This is a case alleging violations of United States antitrust laws, laws that are of fundamental 
importance to American democratic capitalism.”) (citations omitted); Trueposition, Inc. v. LM 
Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11–4574, 2012 WL 707012 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012); In re Air Cargo Shipping 
Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (antitrust laws “essential” to the country’s 
interests); In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2008 WL 2275531 (E.D. Pa. 
May 13, 2008); cf. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Le Carbone Lorraine, S.A., No. 05-6042(JBS), 2008 WL 4126602, at *1 
(D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2008); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 253.  E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Aug. 9, 2000, 218 F.Supp.2d 544, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (“The United States interest in enforcing its criminal laws is unquestionably strong.”); Matter 
of One Grand Jury Subpeona Returnable Jan. 11, 1989, No. N-89-7(TFGD), 1989 WL 49165, at *2 
(D. Conn. Mar. 22, 1989) (“The United States has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws.”). 
This was an important interest recognized even before Aérospatiale. See, e.g., United States v. 
Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d. Cir. 1985) (affirming discovery order for documents in the Cayman 
Islands and noting U.S. interest in enforcing criminal laws); United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079-
CR-HOEVELER, 1990 WL 142524, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 1990), vacated pursuant to settlement 
(Oct. 11, 1990). 
 254.  E.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e find no clear 
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the interests of other sovereigns in 
enforcing bank secrecy laws are outweighed by the need to impede terrorism financing as embodied 
in the tort remedies provided by U.S. civil law and the stated commitments of the foreign nations.”); 
Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 548, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“But in light of the 
significant U.S. interest in eliminating sources of funding for international terrorism, and the other 
factors discussed below, the law governing discovery disputes in this case must ultimately be the 
broad discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
No. 03 C 9370, 2008 WL 192321, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008) (“Congress has also decided that 
the ‘grace and comity’ generally extended to foreign sovereigns should be limited in specific ways, 
particularly when those sovereigns promote terrorist acts that injure U.S. nationals.”); Strauss v. 
Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D 199, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (U.S. interest in “combating 
terrorism”); Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Executive 
and Congressional interests in freezing terrorist financing.”). 
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and fairly adjudicating matters before [U.S.] courts;”255 protecting U.S. 
nationals merely because they were involved in a case as defendants256 or 
vindicating the rights of American plaintiffs;257 ensuring the integrity of the 
financial markets or securities laws;258 personal injury or products liability 
 
 255.  E.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“there is 
an obviously strong U.S. interest in enforcing the final judgment of a federal court, even if the 
judgment is designed to protect the property rights of a private party.”); Tansey v. Cochlear Ltd., No. 
13-CV-4628 (SJF)(SIL), 2014 WL 4676588, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014); Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, 296 F.R.D. 168, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 03 Civ. 
8845(TPG), 2013 WL 491522 at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 
Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, 
Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 335 (N.D. Tex. 2011); Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 
238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd., No. 03–08554 (DCP), 
2009 WL 1055673, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2009); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 
429, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007); Reino De Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03CIV3573LTSRLE, 2005 WL 1813017, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005); Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Dexia Credit 
Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 549 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour le 
Commerce Extérieur v. Phillips Petrol. Comp., 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); First Am. Corp. 
v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 988 F. Supp. 353, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp. 
Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); cf. JW Oilfield Equip., LLC v. Commerzbank AG, 
764 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 
2012 WL 707012 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012); Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici, No. 04 C 3109, 
2005 WL 6246195, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2005); In re Honda Am. Motor Co., 168 F.R.D. 535, 
539 (D. Md. 1996); First Nat’l Bank of Cicero v. Reinhart Vertrieb’s AG, 116 F.R.D. 8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 
1986). But see CE Int’l Res. Holdings, No. 12-CV-08087 (CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, at *14 
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (“By contrast, where the interest is a generalized interest in ‘fully and 
fairly adjudicating matters before its courts,’ . . . courts allocate relatively less weight to the United 
States in this analysis.”); Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 256.  E.g., Reino De Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03CIV3573LTSRLE, 2005 WL 
1813017 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005); Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour le Commerce Extérieur 
v. Phillips Petrol. Comp., 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (U.S. defendant, “an important interest 
in protecting [U.S.] nationals from unfair disadvantage when they are being sued in the courts of 
their own nation.”). 
 257.  E.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992); 
BrightEdge Tech., Inc. v. Searchmetrics, GmbH., No. 14-cv-01009-WHO (MEJ), 2014 WL 
3965062, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014); Pershing Pac. W., LLC v. MarineMax, Inc., No. 10-cv-
1345-L (DHB), 2013 WL 941617, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013); Coloplast A/S. v. Generic Med. 
Devices, Inc., No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL 6330064, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011) (noting “the 
United States’ interests in vindicating the rights of American plaintiffs and in enforcing the 
judgments of its courts, which has been described as vital) (citations and quotation marks omitted); 
Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, No. 07-CV-309-L(AJB), 2008 
WL 81111, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008); In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on Oct. 31, 2000, 211 
F.R.D. 374, 379 (C.D. Cal. 2002); AG Volkswagen v. Valdez, 897 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex. Ct. App.), 
subsequent mandamus proceeding sub nom., 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995); cf. Reinsurance Co. of 
Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat (Admin. of State Ins.), 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 
1990); Int’l Ins. Co. v. Caja Nacional De Ahorro Y Seguro, No. 00 C 6703, 2004 WL 555618, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2004) (citing “interest in the United States’ protecting its citizens”). 
 258.  See, e.g., SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 335 (N.D. Tex. 2011); In 
re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (having “little 
doubt that the United States has a strong interest in enforcing its securities laws.”); United States 
CFTC v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt., No. 07 C 3598, 2007 WL 2915647, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
204 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:1 
 
cases;259 the administration of bankruptcy cases;260 and ad hoc categories, such 
as “assuring restitution to holocaust victims,” “regulating the economy,” 
“ensuring that [U.S.] laws are enforced,” and ensuring “the solvency of 
[American] insurance companies.”261 
Although courts could argue that all of these interests are compelling, two 
complicating consequences weaken that position: (1) there is no discernible 
limiting principle to such a laundry list of interests; and (2) similar foreign 
interests should be equally compelling. Lacking a proper limiting principle, the 
laundry list would continue to grow and swallow the Hague Convention (as it 
arguably did), rendering the entire comity analysis illusory. Extending the 
recognition of these interests to foreign nations—as courts would have to do to 
retain a semblance of balance—would otherwise lead courts back to step one: 
how to compare compelling sovereign interests. The longer the list of 
compelling interests grows, the more difficult such a competing analysis would 
become. Because of this, it is much simpler, more predictable, more effective, 
and more loyal to Hague Convention treaty obligations to enumerate as few 
compelling interests as possible and avoid the complications of a laundry list.  
 
2007) (“strong interest of the U.S. in getting to the bottom of an apparent international scheme to 
engage in commodity trading fraud”); SEC v. Euro Sec. Fund, 98 CIV. 7347(DLC), 1999 WL 
182598, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1999); Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v. 
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“The strength of the United 
States interest in enforcing its securities laws to enforce the integrity of its financial markets cannot 
seriously be doubted.”); cf. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 988 F. Supp. 353, 364 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting an interest in bank fraud cases). 
 259.  See, e.g., Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (“This country has a 
strong interest in these actions because both cases are personal injury actions based on product 
liability from defendant’s construction activities in this country.”); cf. Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm 
Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D.N.J. 1987); Moake v. Source Int’l Corp., 623 A.2d 263, 265 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 349 (D. Conn. 
1997). 
 260.  In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp. Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
 261.  See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 296 F.R.D. 168, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The United 
States has an interest also in ensuring that its laws are enforced.”); Ssangyong Corp. v. Vida Shoes 
Int’l, Inc., No. 03 Civ.5014 KMW DFE, 2004 WL 1125659, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004) (“The 
vital interest of the United States, or any state for that matter, in enforcement of its tax laws is 
unquestionable.”); Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, No. Civ.A. 94-1954, 2002 WL 
472252, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2002) (“This is an instance in which use of the Hague Convention 
procedures would undermine important interests of the United States by impeding the progress of 
this litigation”); Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the United 
States has a “significant interest in assuring restitution to Holocaust victims”); British Int’l Ins. Co. 
Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 90Civ.2370 (JFK)(FM), 2000 WL 713057, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 2, 2000) (“[T]he United States obviously has a great interest in the solvency of its insurance 
companies, one element of which is ensuring that their reinsurers honor their financial 
commitments.”); First Nat’l Bank of Cicero v. Reinhart Vertrieb’s AG, 116 F.R.D. 8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 
1986) (“The United States clearly retains a substantial interest in regulating the economy and 
ensuring private commercial disputes are fairly, yet expeditiously resolved.”). Although outside of 
the purview of this Article, some criminal cases embrace various ad hoc interests as well. See, e.g., 
United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981) (“There is a strong American 
interest in collecting taxes from and prosecuting tax fraud”). 
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The Aérospatiale paradigm utterly failed to do this. 
This laundry list of categories represented the excesses of Aérospatiale. In 
effect, it meant that no U.S. interest was speculative enough to overcome foreign 
law concerns. Such a haphazard categorical analysis even led the Seventh 




 262. Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
263 This table is not exhaustive. It includes cases found in Westlaw and Lexis using broad search 







U.S. Interest Category 
7+ Patent law 
7+ Antitrust law 
7+ Terrorism and criminal law 
21+ Fully adjudicating matters before U.S. courts and enforcing its judgments 
10+ 
Protecting U.S. defendants and 
vindicating the rights of American 
plaintiffs 
3+ Products liability  
7+ Financial markets 
5+ 
Ad Hoc interests (bankruptcy, restitution 
to holocaust victims, regulating the 
economy, ensuring that U.S. laws are 
enforced, and ensuring the solvency of 
American insurance companies.)1 
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Admittedly, such a categorical approach can be efficient for lower courts as 
it allows them to fit the facts of each case into pre-developed groupings that 
have been determined to overcome foreign interests in the transnational 
discovery context. This approach has the added benefit of being consistent and 
predictable to a certain extent. However, lower courts took this approach too far 
by relying on inchoate categories and avoiding a scrutiny of the specific facts of 
each case. Relying on broad categories—for example, a U.S. interest in “fully 
adjudicating matters before U.S courts”—can be unfair for defendants and 
foreign countries because it ignores the factual nuances of each case and 
overvalues U.S. interests. Moreover, loosely defined categories can become 
entrenched and allow courts to forfeit their duty to properly evaluate comity. 
This is precisely what happened after Aérospatiale. Lower courts developed 
loosely defined yet insurmountable interests that unfairly ignored foreign laws 
and, in the words of Daimler, became “uninhibited.” 
For example, an important problem with a categorical interest in “fully and 
fairly adjudicating matters before [the U.S.’s] own courts” is that, by definition, 
it forecloses any possibility of the United States not having a substantial interest 
in any case. This is so because the comity-balancing test is a feature of U.S. 
jurisprudence and therefore will always be evaluated in front of a U.S. court. If 
the United States always has an interest in fully and fairly adjudicating matters 
before its courts—an interest embraced by more than twenty-one cases—then its 
interests will almost always overcome foreign interests, thus rendering 
international comity a dead concept. Such an interest is wildly uninhibited. 
In the same manner, an “interest in vindicating the rights of American 
plaintiffs” will settle any case involving an American plaintiff regardless of 
whether genuine national interests are involved or not. The United States could 
conceivably, given the right set of facts, prefer that an American plaintiff 
proceed through the Hague Convention. But an interest in vindicating the rights 
of American plaintiffs is so broad that it does not allow for a detailed analysis to 
accommodate other, perhaps more valid, national interests. 
These are not hypothetical concerns; they are the natural consequence of 
the flawed categorical analysis that district courts conducted for thirty years. 
This wildly uninhibited approach to discovery was embraced in In re Air Cargo 
Shipping,264 where plaintiff sued Société Air France (“Air France”) for antitrust 
violations due to an alleged price-fixing scheme. During discovery, plaintiff 
moved to compel Air France to produce information held in France. Defendants 
rejected this request because of the risk of criminal sanctions for violating the 
French blocking statute. Applying the comity balancing test, the district court 
noted that the balance of national interests was the “most important” factor and 
that the United States had “several strong national interests” implicated, namely, 
an interest in “antitrust laws whose enforcement is essential to the country’s 
interests in a competitive economy” and “a substantial interest in fully and fairly 
 
 264.  See In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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adjudicating matters before its courts.”265 With those two generalities uttered 
and nothing more, the court found it necessary to compel the production of 
documents held in France.266 
Similarly, in Pershing Pacific West, LLC v. MarineMax, Inc., an American 
company brought claims against a German defendant, among others, for the 
faulty manufacture of a yacht.267 When plaintiff demanded the production of 
documents related to the manufacturing process, defendant objected that 
German law did not permit such discovery except through the Hague 
Convention. In its analysis of the national interests involved, the district court 
specified that “[w]e must assess the interests of each nation in requiring or 
prohibiting disclosure, and determine whether disclosure would affect important 
substantive policies or interests of either the United States or [Germany.]”268 
Then, however, the court engaged in a perfunctory three-sentence analysis of 
U.S. interests, noting that “[t]he United States has a[n] interest in vindicating the 
rights of American plaintiffs,” and that “[t]his interest has been described as 
vital.”269 Without any further scrutiny, the court then evaluated German law, 
which penalized the discovery at issue. Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
discovery should proceed through the Federal Rules because, among other 
things, the national interests “factor weighs slightly in favor of the United 
States’ interest and disclosure under the Federal Rules.”270 The court apparently 
did not find it necessary to note that the Hague Convention was an available 
“avenue” that could satisfy the sovereign interests involved. 
In re Air Cargo Shipping and Pershing Pacific West are representative of a 
wider jurisprudence that engaged in a meaningless analysis of national interests 
lacking any rigor. The courts merely surmised that the antitrust violations at 
issue in In re Air Cargo Shipping and the interests in vindicating the rights of 
American plaintiffs in Pershing Pacific West involved actual U.S. interests in 
those particular cases. The In re Air Cargo Shipping court made no findings 
regarding the specific interests of the United States in that particular case. Both 
courts were satisfied with making general unsubstantiated statements about 
national interests. Clearly, both courts failed to properly take international 
comity into account. 
It is difficult to reconcile the existence of a balancing test and the Hague 
Convention with the perfunctory dismissal of foreign interests. These decisions 
exemplify the problems with Aérospatiale-inspired judicial chest-thumping, 
 
 265.  Id. at 54. 
 266.  Id. at 55. 
 267.  Pershing Pac. W., LLC v. MarineMax, Inc., No. 10-CV-1345-L(DHB), 2013 WL 941617, 
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013), on reconsideration in part, 2013 WL 1628938 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 
2013).  
 268.  Id. at *8. 
 269.  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 270.  Id. at *9. 
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concerned only with “reaffirming the sovereignty of our judicial system.”271 
Categorical interests have rendered the Convention inapplicable in almost all 
cases. Such an approach must change in light of Daimler and its progeny. 
B. Daimler Demands a More Individualized Analysis of U.S. Interests 
The limits to U.S. jurisdiction recognized in Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola 
and the renewed importance of international comity strike directly at the 
categorical analysis that allows an overvaluing of U.S. interests and the 
overbroad exercise of raw judicial power. The main problem noted by these 
courts was the “uninhibited” reach of U.S. jurisdiction, and by extension, 
discovery. Because of this, as explained below, Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola 
teach that U.S. interests have to be specific to each case and cannot be based on 
speculative generalities. 
In Daimler, the Ninth Circuit affirmed jurisdiction over a case that had no 
relationship to the United States, but instead involved foreign officials and a 
foreign corporation. The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding due 
to the threat to international comity posed by the Ninth Circuit’s “uninhibited 
approach to personal jurisdiction.”272 The Supreme Court did not speak in 
generalities about U.S. interests. Instead, it directly quoted the Solicitor 
General’s opinion that uninhibited personal jurisdiction had “in the past impeded 
negotiations of international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.”273 This approach at least valued non-speculative 
interests. In Gucci, the lower court held the State-owned Bank of China in 
contempt for actions wholly unrelated to their New York branch. In reviewing 
this decision, the Second Circuit did not overvalue speculative U.S. interests. It 
instead asked the United States to express its interests in the case through an 
amicus. Likewise, in Motorola, the plaintiff sought to restrain assets of a British 
bank wherever located regardless of any foreign criminal laws penalizing such 
actions or of any jurisdictional concerns. The Motorola court described at length 
why the separate entity rule was incredibly important for New York. 
Applying the teachings of Daimler means that U.S. interests need to be 
more than merely speculative or stated in broad terms. This can be done by 
following two steps: (1) limiting the categories included as “important U.S. 
interests” and (2) evaluating the interests of the United States in each specific 
case rather than through mere generalities. Courts may use these two methods to 
begin engaging in a proper and legitimate balancing of U.S. interests against 
foreign law concerns. These two methods can work in the following ways: 
Daimler and its progeny embraced a standard that counsels the following: 
U.S. interests should be specific to the case and not just broad, uninhibited, and 
 
 271.  Fields, supra note 112. 
 272.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
 273.  Id. 
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vague. Excessive interests, such as “the United States[‘s] . . . interest in fully and 
fairly adjudicating matters before its courts”274 or vindicating the rights of an 
American plaintiff,275 must be rejected. A good example of this constrained 
approach was embraced in Weiss v. National Westminster Bank, PLC,276 where 
survivors of terrorist attacks sued terrorist group Hamas, seeking assets held by 
U.K. based National Westminster Bank. When plaintiffs sought banking 
documents in the United Kingdom, defendant refused and demanded compliance 
with the Hague Convention. In its comity analysis, the court analyzed U.S. 
interests in-depth. After noting that the United States had an interest in 
“combating terrorism,” it scrutinized how that interest applied against Hamas 
and related defendants (Interpal), noting that “[t]he American interest in 
disrupting terrorist networks with global assistance from American allies is 
particularly apparent here,”277 because the Department of the Treasury had 
designated the particular groups involved in the case (Hamas charities) as 
terrorists. Moreover, the court highlighted that “not only does the United States 
have a demonstrated interest in halting terrorist financing, both domestically and 
internationally, but the United States has also explicitly found that NatWest’s 
client, Interpal, is a ‘principal’ conduit for those funds.”278 This represented a 
laser-like focus on the defendant at issue and not on the general interest in 
combating terrorism. 
The most important point to notice about Weiss is that the court narrowed 
the specific interests of the United States to those involved in that particular 
case. The court refused to rely on uninhibited platitudes about U.S. interests in 
combating “terrorism” generally, but instead focused on NatWest’s client, 
Interpal, who was involved in the case. 
Another example of this salutary approach was adopted in Doster v. 
Schenk, where defendants claimed that subpoenas to produce information 
located in Germany were intrusive under Germany’s constitutional principle of 
 
 274.  See supra note 255. Other cases have adopted similarly tenuous interests. See, e.g., In re 
Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y 2010) (U.S. litigants and 
antitrust laws “essential” to the country’s interests); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 
199, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (U.S. plaintiffs and interest in “combating terrorism”); In re Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02CIV5571RJH/HBP, 2006 WL 3378115, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 
2006) (U.S. plaintiffs, U.S. witness, and securities laws); Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (U.S. plaintiffs, “significant interest in assuring restitution to Holocaust victims,” 
alien tort claims act, and tort law); Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour le Commerce Extérieur 
v. Phillips Petro. Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (U.S. defendant, “an important interest in 
protecting [U.S.] nationals,” and contract law); Soletanche & Rodio, Inc. v. Brown & Lambrecht 
Earth Movers, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (U.S. plaintiff and patent law); In re Glob. Power 
Equip. Grp. Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 849–50, n.7 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (U.S. company, bankruptcy laws 
and U.S. courts). 
 275.  See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02CIV5571RJH/HBP, 2006 WL 
3378115, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006). 
 276.  Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 277.  Id. at 47 (emphasis added).  
 278.  Id. at 48. 
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proportionality “pursuant to which a judge must protect personal privacy, 
commercial property, and business secrets.”279 Those were speculative interests 
expressed in broad terms, much like those embraced by the Aérospatiale-era 
courts. The Doster court, however, rejected this argument because “[e]ven if the 
Court were to recognize those principles as significant sovereign interests, 
defendant must show that the specific discovery in these cases would 
compromise those interests by a resort to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”280 Although this case involved the analysis of German interests and 
not the United States’ interests, the approach is illustrative. 
Courts should focus on the “specific discovery” requested in each case and 
how it would “compromise” U.S. interests. They should not answer these 
questions through generalities. This approach is important because, as some 
courts have recognized, “[U.S.] interests diminish the less closely a case is 
related to the United States.”281 A court can only determine how “closely a case 
is related to the United States” through an individualized analysis. For example, 
in a case involving antitrust laws, a court should not effuse that the enforcement 
of those laws “is essential to the country’s interests in a competitive 
economy.”282 That kind of general statement is uninhibited, ignores the 
particularities of the case, and fails to rigorously evaluate the interests at stake. 
Instead, courts should analyze why the United States has a specific interest in 
the particular case by referring to previous instances where the United States 
submitted amici in similar cases, or policy statements from the U.S. Justice 
Department antitrust division showing an interest in the particular antitrust 
violations. That is exactly what the court did in Weiss where it highlighted that 
the Department of the Treasury had designated the particular groups involved in 
that case as terrorists. Daimler and its progeny demand this approach. 
Although employing a categorical analysis is not always inappropriate, it 
should only be the beginning of an international-comity scrutiny. Thus, for 
example, cases involving patents can be analyzed by courts through recognition 
that the U.S. has an important interest in patents generally; but, in addition, they 
should find that the patents involved in the case are relevant to the U.S. 
government. This method combines the benefits of a categorical approach with 
an individualized case-by-case analysis. A list of legitimate interests would 
include cases that involve U.S. criminal laws, antitrust laws, or terrorism laws, 
as well as U.S. government agencies or possible impact on a broad segment of 
the population. The most important benefit of this approach is that it forces 
courts to conduct a more individualized analysis that will improve respect for 
international comity. 
 
 279.  Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 54 (M.D.N.C. 1991). 
 280.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 281.  Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 282.  In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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One possible negative effect of employing a more specific analysis of U.S. 
interests is that it would require more specialized knowledge from courts and 
might weigh down dockets. To deal with these problems, this Article advocates 
a more proactive approach by the federal government in these cases. Courts and 
litigants should seek direct input from the government. As described below, this 
approach would be in line with prior case law and would be relatively easy to 
employ. 
Courts have previously recognized that the United States has a “right to 
make its position known in cases with important foreign policy 
ramifications.”283 Some courts have even emphasized the importance of this 
type of input.284 Although it is not realistic to expect letters or amici from the 
government in every case, both Gucci and Daimler show that when these kinds 
of input are present, courts are much better informed. Government input is 
beneficial because the executive is much better equipped than courts to evaluate 
the interests of the nation in each particular case. As noted by Justice Blackman 
in his Aérospatiale dissent, “[i]t is the Executive that normally decides when a 
course of action is important enough to risk affronting a foreign nation or 
placing a strain on foreign commerce. It is the Executive, as well, that is best 
equipped to determine how to accommodate foreign interests along with our 
own.”285 The executive should, through letters and amici, supplement judicial 
determinations by emphasizing the interests of the United States in discovery 
cases. After Daimler, it is no longer legitimate to continue the judicial policy of 
determining U.S. interests without the input of the executive because, “[u]nlike 
the courts, diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition, designed to 
exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which accompany the 
realization of national interests within the sphere of international association.”286 
In short, whenever a comity issue arises in the context of discovery, courts 
should request that the executive intervene in some way. 
Government intervention in discovery cases might dramatically burden the 
executive’s workload. However, there are various practical ways in which the 
executive can assert the government’s interest without significant added burden. 
This might include the submission of department letters of interest, re-used 
amici, policy papers, or regulatory statements. For example, as described above, 
the Weiss court relied on a Department of the Treasury designation of a terrorist 
 
 283.  Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 C 9370, 2008 WL 192321, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
18, 2008), rev’d and remanded, 637 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2011); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 
U.S. 677, 714 (2004) (the United States may recommend dismissal in a variety of cases). 
 284.  Freund v. Republic of France, 592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he 
Executive Branch has described the interests of the United States in this matter through its Statement 
of Interest . . . the general interests it describes also bear on the Court’s overall exercise of its 
discretion in connection with Plaintiffs’ discovery request.”). 
 285.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 552 (1987). 
 286.  Id. (quotations and citations omitted).  
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
212 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:1 
 
group. The court did not need further input from the government. Below, this 
Article discusses other methods that are currently used by foreign governments 
to achieve this.  Although this may be difficult in lower court proceedings, 
courts should experiment with requesting different types of input. 
C. The Need for Input from Foreign Countries 
For over two decades, courts have recognized the importance of direct 
input from foreign governments in transnational discovery cases.287 At various 
times, however, courts have also ignored letters from foreign ministers and 
ordered the production of documents located abroad despite foreign protests.288 
Daimler and its progeny urge courts to increase their openness to direct foreign 
input in transnational discovery cases. 
There is little doubt that direct foreign input can strengthen a foreign 
party’s arguments. In Gucci America, Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, a case involving 
the production of documents located in Malaysia, the court noted that, “the 
Malaysian government has not voiced any objections to disclosure in this case, 
which the Second Circuit has found militates against a finding that strong 
national interests of the foreign country are at stake.”289 Similarly, in In re 
Honda America Motor Co., the court recriminated the Japanese government for 
failing to intervene in the transnational discovery question at issue, highlighting 
that “[t]he failure of the Japanese government to weigh in as amicus curie on 
this matter is further evidence that its sovereignty is not implicated” in the 
case.290 These statements can be so important that some courts have declared 
that without foreign input it is difficult for courts to weigh sovereign interests at 
all. In British International Insurance Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., where 
plaintiff sought documents in Mexico, the court noted that “[t]he level of 
[sovereign] interest is difficult to gauge in this case since the Mexican 
government has not taken any steps to object to the discovery sought . . .”291 
 
 287.  See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); Minpeco, S.A. v. 
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Switzerland’s interest 
substantial as expounded in two official statements). 
 288.  Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (ordering 
production despite letter from the Chinese Ministry of Justice); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 
F.R.D. 429, 447–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (ordering production through the Federal Rules despite a letter 
from the French Ministry of Justice, noting that “[w]ith the utmost respect for the Republic of 
France, this court has gone to great lengths to analyze and balance the various interests at stake, 
including those of the United States, France, and the litigants, yet the French Ministry’s letter has 
added little to the analysis that justifies altering in any significant way the court’s prior balancing of 
the national interests”). 
 289.  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (quotations and citations omitted).  
 290.  In re Honda Am. Motor Co., 168 F.R.D. 535, 538 (D. Md. 1996). 
 291.  British Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A, No. 90Civ.2370(JFK)(FM), 2000 
WL 713057, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2000). 
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Requiring input from foreign sovereigns should be institutionalized to 
complement the reduced emphasis on U.S. interests. Courts should routinely 
require input from foreign countries, either through government officials or 
agencies. The U.S. amicus in Gucci advocated this approach, arguing that when 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws implicate foreign sovereign interests, 
“submissions from interested governments that address comity issues should be 
given serious consideration.”292 Requiring input from foreign governments 
serves three goals: (1) avoiding the “danger of unwarranted judicial interference 
in the conduct of foreign policy;”293 (2) tackling judges’ lack of experience with 
foreign law by giving them reliable information about those laws; and (3) 
continuing Daimler’s call for “inhibiting” U.S. judicial power. 
At least one Supreme Court justice has explicitly voiced support for this 
approach. In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.—involving the 
worldwide discovery of Argentine sovereign property under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act—Argentina argued during oral argument that foreign 
countries opposed such discovery of Argentine property in their countries.294 
Justice Scalia responded by asking, 
Why haven’t foreign countries protested? Why aren’t they here as amici? Is there 
a single foreign state that has taken your position? . . . They file amicus briefs all 
the time and if this is as horrific as [Argentina is] painting it, we would have had 
some briefs from them.295 
Justice Scalia’s eagerness to hear from other countries should be shared by all 
courts. If foreign countries do not intervene through amici or letters, then courts 
should feel free to make adverse inferences.296 This would encourage countries 
to intervene whenever possible. In Daimler, the Supreme Court took special 
notice of the Solicitor General’s opinion in amici and European Union general 
jurisdiction rules. The Court quoted specific foreign law language provided by 
foreign organizations’ amici.297 In Motorola, the court also took special heed of 
Jordan and the U.A.E.’s reactions to the restraining notices. 
These cases are exhorting courts to seek more information about foreign 
interests. Indeed, these cases seem to be saying that whenever a litigant faces 
requests for discovery of documents or property located abroad, they should find 
documentary support to counteract the request. Even if this means submitting 
 
 292.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122 
(2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-3934), 2014 WL 2290273, at *3. 
 293.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013). 
 294.  Oral Argument Transcript, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 
(2014) (No. 12-842), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-842_3c45.pdf. 
 295.  Id. at 22. 
 296.  Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(stating that district court has “broad discretion” in dealing with breaches of discovery obligations, 
including the power to draw an adverse inference).  
 297.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
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amici from other cases or any other policy statement. Switzerland has been 
particularly active in this area, submitting amici even in district court 
proceedings.298 The current system relies on expert submissions by the parties, 
which the U.S. government took seriously in Gucci, arguing that the “Gucci 
[lower] court should have been more mindful . . . and should not have 
summarily dismissed representations describing the national importance of 
China’s banking secrecy laws.”299 This can be supplemented by letters as China 
submitted in Gucci, where Chinese regulators expressed China’s objections to 
the overbroad discovery requests.300 Letters provide an efficient alternative to 
amici. Parties should try to obtain letters from local government officials that 
detail limitations under local law, express their preference for the Hague 
Convention, and describe problems with U.S. style discovery.301 
 
 298.  See Brief for Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–
2, 13–15, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 
2009).  
 299.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Gucci Am., Inc., v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 
122 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11-3934), 2014 WL 2290273, at *3 (emphasis added). 
 300.  See Letter from Huai Peng Mu, supra note 2. 
 301.  Even if courts welcome input from foreign sovereigns and begin to cabin U.S. interests, 
they may still have to use a balancing test. A great concern with Aérospatiale is that it 
“regrettably. . . declined to set forth specific rules” for the international comity analysis. Scarminach 
v. Goldwell Gmbh, 531 N.Y.2d 188, 189 (1988). Adding to this difficulty is that lower courts felt 
compelled to analyze all of the factors expressed in the Restatement test, instead of engaging in a 
more qualitative analysis that can be both simpler but also more rigorous. Daimler is a good example 
of a simpler international comity analysis. The Supreme Court warned of the dangers to international 
comity and then analyzed only four factors: (1) European Union laws, (2) the Solicitor General’s 
views, (3) the Defendant’s arguments, and (4) the fair play and substantial justice concerns involved 
in the case. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). This basic test is different from the 
current balancing test in that it is both simpler but more substantive. Instead of attributing 
speculative interests to the United States, the Court focused on a specific interest voiced by the 
executive in that particular context. Moreover, the Supreme Court took into account “fair play and 
substantial justice” in the context of international comity, not just as another element in a personal 
jurisdiction test. Id. at 763. This should, without doubt, be incorporated by lower courts.  
A rigorous analysis of the fair play and substantial justice concerns of requiring foreign companies 
to produce documents in accordance with the Federal Rules would cut against the excesses of the 
Aérospatiale era. For example, the Second Circuit should overturn its finding in First Am. Corp. v. 
Price Waterhouse LLP, that a foreign non-party can be ordered to produce documents in the same 
manner as a litigant. Fair play and substantial justice after Gucci counsel a change of law in this 
context. As a general matter, courts should adopt the rule that “an order compelling production 
should be imposed on a nonparty . . . only in extreme circumstances.” Minpeco, S.A. v. 
Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 331, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). And this rule should be even 
more important in the context of foreign non-parties who may have no reason to expect being hauled 
to U.S. courts for actions wholly unrelated to their operations. Moreover, an emphasis on fair play 
and substantial justice would overturn the Third Circuit’s finding in In re Auto. Refinishing Paint 
Antitrust Litig., that the Hague Convention should not be employed for jurisdictional discovery. 358 
F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004). If anything, international comity means that the Convention should always 
apply in cases of jurisdictional discovery where a court has not even established jurisdiction. Beyond 
this, courts should also incorporate the approach advocated by the U.S. amicus in Gucci that urged 
courts to take into account a wider balancing test provided by Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations Law, which evaluates “the importance of [a foreign] regulation to the 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z384K2P
2016] INTERNATIONAL COMITY IN TRANSNATIONAL DISCOVERY 215 
 
*  *      * 
In sum, Daimler, Gucci, and Motorola counsel that discovery of documents 
abroad can no longer be “uninhibited.” A good starting place would be to 
qualitatively limit the kind of U.S. interests that are considered “substantial.” By 
focusing on the specific interests involved in each case and by soliciting foreign 
input whenever possible, courts can begin to honor their comity duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Daimler and its progeny suggest that the thirty-year Aérospatiale paradigm 
is coming to an end. The United States Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and 
the New York State Court of Appeals have revived international comity with 
decisions that prominently denied the uninhibited exercise of raw judicial power 
over foreign parties. Influenced by concerns with international commerce and 
retaliation by foreign sovereigns, these courts have imposed limits on judicial 
power. Even if courts continue to reject the Hague Convention and alternatives 
to overbroad U.S. discovery, we should never again see the excesses of the 
Aérospatiale-era which discarded the Convention as a useless treaty and 
affirmed U.S. transnational discovery rules in almost all cases. 
If Daimler and its progeny are taken to their logical conclusion, the 
balancing of foreign interests should change dramatically. Courts should focus 
on the specific interests of the United States involved in each case, and should 
refrain from ruling based on mere generalities. Courts should also create a more 
routine procedure for acquiring executive and foreign input in particular cases. 
Finally, the comity balancing test should be reworked to emphasize this input 
from foreign countries and the U.S. government. Generally, lower courts should 
begin to experiment with ways to change the current comity analysis to 
accommodate the Daimler emphasis on international comity. 
Taking everything into account, international comity in the discovery 
context is making a comeback. Following in the footsteps of Morrison and 
Kiobel, the U.S. judiciary seems ready to adopt a more diplomatic stance in the 
face of foreign interests. The changing nature of the modern global economy 
and the danger of retaliation by foreign countries should continue to influence 
these developments. What is clear is that U.S. courts are more attuned to 
international norms than they have been in the recent past, especially in the 
context of discovery. 
 
international political, legal, or economic system.” Such an approach would allow courts to consider 
the possible effects of any case on the global economy and consider a wider array of foreign 
interests. 
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